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ABSTRACT

Governments in different states and even different governments within the same state
may pursue different goals. To achieve their goals they apply administrative reforms,
including civil service reforms, to adjust the government for achieving the intended
goals. Pursuing different goals entails applying different administrative reforms. In
the 2000s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested the
Egyptian government, through loan conditionality, an administrative and civil service
reform to promote economic growth based on their concept of good governance. In
this paper, I argue that the suggested reform does not target economic growth but
targets debt repayment. To demonstrate the contradiction between the suggested
reform and the alleged goal, in the first chapter I review the history of civil service
reform in Egypt from the time of Mohamed Ali Pasha until the suggested reforms by
the World Bank and the IMF. This review shows that different Egyptian rulers
reformed the civil service to play a certain role while the foreign creditors of the 19 th
century applied similar reforms to those of the international financial institutions to
secure debt repayment. In the second chapter, I explain the role of the civil service
according to the concept of good governance upon which the World Bank and the
IMF suggested the administrative and civil service reform in Egypt. In the third
chapter, I tackle the critique of the suggested civil service reform to show that its main
goal is making savings to ensure debt repayment, not improving the civil service to
perform the assigned role.
KEY WORDS: Good Governance, Civil Service Reform, Administrative Reform,
World Bank, IMF, Egypt, Debt.
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I.

Introduction

In 1982, the Egyptian writer Nazih N. M. Ayubi wrote describing the performance of
the Egyptian civil servants. He mentioned that many of the Egyptian civil servants
were not punctual as they used to arrive at work at 10 or 10:30 in the morning and get
ready to leave at 12 or 12:30 at noon.1 Yet, the time they spent actually working
during work hours was estimated to range from twenty minutes to two hours.2 This is
because while being in the office they enjoyed visiting and talking to each other,
drinking tea, coffee, and soft drinks, reading newspapers, and knitting.3 They also
bought snacks, perfumes, and shoelaces from the vendors who passed by.4 He added,
the administrative performance suffered from carelessness and negligence along with
routine and red tape, and repetitiveness of formalities and procedures.5
Ayubi did not expect the performance of the Egyptian civil service to improve in the
near future.6 He expected that because the salaries of the civil servants, which were
already low, would become less attractive than the salaries offered by the projects of
the then-new open-door policy.7 Furthermore, the salaries would not be able to cope
up with the rate of inflation.8
Ayubi's expectations were not wrong. The situation of the Egyptian civil service has
become worse.9 The Egyptian civil service still suffers from oversize and low
efficiency of performance.10 Low salaries still lead to inflation and low productivity.11
Corruption is widespread across the departments of the Egyptian civil service.12

1

Nazih N. M. Ayubi, Bureaucratic inflation and administrative inefficiency: the deadlock in Egyptian
administration, 18 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 292 (1982),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263208208700512 (last visited Apr 25, 2021).
2
Id. at 292.
3
Id. at 293.
4
Id. at 293.
5
Id. at 295.
6
Id. at 297.
7
Id. at 297.
8
Id. at 297.
9
IN DEPTH-PROS AND CONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW DEBATED, AMCHAM ,
https://www.amcham.org.eg/publications/business-monthly/issues/237/September-2015/3334/prosand-cons-of-the-civil-service-law-debated (last visited Jul 26, 2021).
10
Amr Adly, Civil Service Reform in Egypt: Between Efficiency and Social Peace, CARNEGIE MIDDLE
EAST CENTER , https://carnegie-mec.org/2016/03/27/civil-service-reform-in-egypt-between-efficiencyand-social-peace-pub-63442 (last visited Jul 26, 2021).
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These long-lasting problems of the Egyptian civil service require a reform strategy to
improve the situation. To do so we need to know what is meant by the "civil service"
so we can know precisely the object of the reform. We also need to know what the
problems that we need to fix are. Finally, we need to figure out the best way to fix
these problems.
There is no agreement on what is meant by the civil service as it is different from one
state to another. Some states count health employees as civil servants; other states
consider teachers as civil servants, while others consider the police as civil servants.13
Therefore, as long as reform is concerned, what is meant by civil service shall depend
on what needs to be reformed through the reform strategy.
Civil service reform is not a target in itself because there is no role model of civil
service.14 Therefore, civil service reform is dependent on the problems that need to be
fixed. Thus, the definition of the civil service is dependent on the reform strategy and
the reform strategy is dependent on the problems that need to be fixed, being
structural, fiscal, or both. Usually, reform strategies are either structural or fiscal.
Structural reforms are concerned with the efficiency of the civil service. Efficiency
means the ability of the civil service to perform the role that it was entrusted to
perform. Fiscal reforms are concerned with the financial burdensome of running the
civil service. The fiscal aspect of running the civil service is mainly related to the
wage bill that includes the salaries of the civil servants, their pensions, rewards,
bonuses, allowances, etc.
Throughout history, different reform strategies have been put for the Egyptian civil
service by the rulers and by the foreign creditors. Each reform strategy was set to
adjust the civil service to perform the role assigned to it according to the role played
by the government and its goals. Hence, different goals entail different reform
strategies. In this thesis, I focus on the reform strategy suggested to Egypt by the
World Bank and the IMF.
11

Id.
Id.
13
NICK MANNING & NEIL PARISON, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 23 (2003), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/0-82135572-4 (last visited Mar 9, 2021).
14
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, II THE GOALS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM,
https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/books/071/16020-9780821350959-en/ch02.xml (last visited Sep 19,
2021).
12
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International financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF help countries in
making development and economic growth.15 They do so by providing financial
products and technical assistance, and by promoting financial stability and monetary
cooperation.16 Starting from the 1980s, they started advising governments in
developing countries about the best way of governance to promote development and
economic growth.17 They differentiated between good governance and bad
governance. Bad governance was identified as the mode of governance where the
government plays a big role in leading the economy, which was the situation in the
1960s and the 1970s.18 On the other hand, the main element of good governance is the
government's assignment of a bigger role to the private sector in leading the
economy.19 Since the role played by the government in the economy became the key
element in defining good governance, international financial institutions became
interested in defining the right size of the public sector.20 The size of the public sector
is dependent on the role assigned to it in the state and since this role is minimal, the
size of the public sector ought to be minimal.21 But the size of the public sector in the
developing countries that receive help from the international financial institutions is
already big because of the economic policies of the 1960s and the 1970s that were
state-centric22 and also due to political factors like using recruitment in the civil
service by rulers as means to reward supporters or to please the public.23 Therefore,
helping those developing countries in promoting development and economic growth
necessitated reforming their public sectors to reflect the new minimal role assigned to
the government.24

15

What We do, WORLD BANK , https://www.worldbank.org/en/what-we-do (last visited Apr 9, 2021);
The IMF at a Glance, IMF , https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/IMF-at-a-Glance (last visited
Apr 9, 2021).
16
Id.
17
International Monetary Fund, The Role of the Fund in Governance Issues - Review of the Guidance
Note - Preliminary Considerations - Background Notes, 17 POLICY PAPERS 12 (2017).
18
Richard Ponzio & Sakiko Fukuda, Governance: Past, Present, Future - Setting the Governance
Agenda for the Millennium Declaration 3 (2002).
19
International Monetary Fund, supra note 17 at 12.
20
Stephanie J Rickard, International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on the
public sector 38 (2018).
21
Kerry Rittich, Theoretical Antecedents of Neoliberalism, 3 in RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING:
LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 122 (2002).
22
Ponzio and Sakiko Fukuda, supra note 18 at 3.
23
WORLD BANK, Middle East and North Africa Public employment and governance in MENA 4
(2016).
24
Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’l L. 208 (2004).
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According to the concept of good governance embraced by the international financial
institutions, the government should focus on improving the infrastructure and
providing social services especially health and education services.25 To be able to do
its role, the government needs to reform its civil service that shall perform that role.
Reforming the civil service, according to the concept of good governance, means
downsizing, freezing wage increase to control the growth of the wage bill, changing
the civil service law to combat corruption and rent-seeking activities, and enhancing
transparency and efficiency.26 Changing the civil service law should also allow for
hiring civil servants through fixed-term contracts instead of hiring them
permanently.27 Furthermore, the government should contract out providing many of
its services to the private sector.28
Literature on evaluating the success of these reforms, including in-house evaluations
by the World Bank and the IMF, shows that these reforms did not succeed in
achieving their targets in the countries where they were applied. The targets of the
reforms were found to be contradictory, not sustainable, disregarding political
constraints, and inefficient. It was even suggested that developing countries might
need exactly the opposite of the reforms suggested by the World Bank and the IMF.29
Yet, the World Bank and the IMF keep pushing developing countries to apply these
reforms through incorporating them in their conditionality.30
In this thesis, by focusing on Egypt, I explain that the suggested reform strategy is
defective and its main goal is to secure debt repayment. I also argue that the reform

25

WORLD BANK, Egypt Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for FY 2002-2004 iii (2005).
International Monetary Fund, Request for Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility,
IMF PRESS RELEASE 56 (2016).
27
WORLD BANK, supra note 25 at 13.
28
Id. at 13.
29
See generally, Nadeem Ul Haque and Ratna Sahay, Do Government Wage Cuts Close Budget
Deficits? Costs of Corruption, 43 PALGRAVE MACMILLAN JOURNALS ON BEHALF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1996), CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: STRENGTHENING WORLD BANK
AND IMF COLLABORATION, (World Bank & International Monetary Fund eds., 2002), Stephanie J
Rickard, International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector
(2018), Wouter van Acker, CIVIL SERVICE RECRUITMENT: RECRUITING THE RIGHT PERSONS
THE RIGHT WAY (2019), Wouter van Acker and Zahid Hasnain, WAGE BILL AND PAY REFORM: A
FIRST GLANCE AND A LOOK FORWARD (2019), and NICK MANNING & NEIL PARISON,
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
(2003).
30
See generally, International Monetary Fund, Request for Extended Arrangement under the Extended
Fund Facility, IMF PRESS RELEASE (2016), WORLD BANK, Egypt Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)
for FY 2002-2004 (2005), and WORLD BANK, COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR ARAB
REPUBLIC OF EGYPT FY2015-2019 (2015).
26
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strategy suggested by the World Bank and the IMF is not different from the previous
reform strategies; it deals with the structural and fiscal aspects of the civil service
while ignoring the role of the state as a service provider for the public and guarantor
of welfare through the civil service.
To support this claim I divided the thesis into three chapters. The first chapter
addresses the history of the civil service reform in Egypt. It starts with the time of
Mohamed Ali Pasha, followed by the time of his successors during the debt crisis and
the intervention of the foreign creditors. Then it moves to the time of Nasser and
Sadat after the independence of Egypt and finally the present time when the civil
service reform was initiated in 2015 after the loan agreements with the IMF and the
World Bank. This chapter emphasizes that there is a relationship between the role of
the government and the strategy of the civil service reform. It explores the civil
service reform strategy suggested by the IMF and the World Bank according to their
good governance policy to reach, in the following chapters, an understanding of the
role of the government according to the good governance policy and how effective
this reform strategy is. This chapter also points out how through history the
beneficiary of the civil service was the ruler and the civil servants without enough
consideration for the obligations of the state towards the public, especially its
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill their human rights through the civil service.
The second chapter tackles the history of the concept of good governance. It explains
how different modes of governance were followed in the 1960s and the 1970s then
moves to the emergence of the concept of good governance in the 1980s. It also lists
some of the different definitions of good governance adopted by different institutions
with a special focus on the IMF and the World Bank. Further, it addresses the
relationship between good governance and the civil service. Because of this
relationship and the effect of bad civil service on good governance, I discuss
corruption in the civil service and accountability of the civil servants, especially
through ombudsperson bodies.
The third chapter discusses the critique of the World Bank's and the IMF's reform
strategy of the civil service. The first part of the chapter deals with the internal
critique. It addresses the inefficiency of controlling the public wage bill and freezing
salaries, and amending the civil service law to allow for downsizing, using a merit5

based system for recruitment and promotion, using fixed-term contracts for hiring
civil servants, and contracting out public services. Then it moves to the World Bank's
and the IMF's in-house critique where they acknowledge many of the downsides of
the good governance reform policy. The second part, the external critique, deals with
the similarity between the reform strategy of the World Bank and the IMF and the
previous reforms. It emphasizes that all of them dealt with the structural and fiscal
aspects of the civil service reform while ignoring the public as the main beneficiary of
the public services provided by the civil service.
Finally, I conclude that the suggested reforms by the World Bank and the IMF based
on their concept of good governance are defective and their main goal is to secure
debt repayment. The World Bank and the IMF claim that their reform strategy should
help the state achieve its economic goals by minimizing the role of the state and
maximizing the role of the private sector in the economy. To achieve the prescribed
economic goals the government should cut unnecessary expenditures and limit its
spending to improving the infrastructure and providing social services, especially
health and education. And for the state to do so it needs a small and efficient civil
service. However, because debt repayment is the highest priority of the World Bank
and the IMF their reform strategy neither succeeds in improving the efficiency of the
civil service nor leaves enough revenues to spend on the social services.

6
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II.

History of the Civil Service Reform in Egypt
The civil service is the government's tool to implement its policies. The effectiveness
of that tool is related to its ability to perform the role that it was entrusted to do.
Reforming the civil service means adjusting it to perform its role well. Therefore, the
content of the civil service reform is subject to the goals that the government wants to
achieve. In other words, there is no one strategy for the civil service reform, as each
government shall reform its civil service according to the role it is going to play.
This chapter traces the different approaches that were taken in dealing with the
Egyptian civil service starting from 1810 to 2016. It shows how different rulers of
Egypt and its foreign creditors used the civil service for different goals. It starts with
the time of Mohamed Ali Pasha, followed by the time of his successors during the
debt crisis. Then it moves to the time of Nasser and Sadat after the independence of
Egypt and finally the present time when the civil service reform was initiated in 2015
after the loan agreements with the IMF and the World Bank. Tracing these different
approaches shows that each of the previous reform initiatives had its own purpose.
The chapter also sheds the light on the reform strategy of the IMF and the World
Bank to figure out, in the following chapters, the purpose of the suggested reform and
its efficiency.

A. The Time of Mohamed Ali Pasha
According to the Egyptian historian Khaled Fahmy, Mohamed Ali Pasha wanted to
build a strong disciplined army in Egypt.31 In the 1810s, he relied mainly on Albanian
troops but they resisted his efforts to impose discipline.32 Therefore, in the 1820s, he
resorted to building the army by bringing slaves from Sudan.33 Yet, this step also did
not succeed so he thought of depending on the Egyptians by conscripting them.34 In
the beginning, Mohamed Ali hesitated in conscripting Egyptians because they were
not accustomed to the military life and because his government was not strong enough
to enforce conscription like western governments but as it later proved to be
successful, he started to depend mainly on this method.35

KHALED FAHMY, ALL THE PASHA’S MEN - MEHMED ALI, HIS ARMY AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
EGYPT 78 (2002).
32
Id. at 80.
33
Id. at 80.
34
Id. at 89.
35
Id. at 93–96.
31
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Regardless of the initial success of the conscription, it faced some obstacles when
Mohamed Ali expanded its application.36 This was because Egyptians were reluctant
to leaving their villages to join the army and the shaykhs of the villages helped them
to evade conscription.37 Also, the officers responsible for gathering men from the
villages did not follow standards in choosing them so they chose unfit men for the
army.38 Moreover, pulling too many men from working in agriculture to join the army
had a bad impact on agriculture.39
To overcome these obstacles, new techniques had to be found.40 In 1830, Mohamed
Ali issued qanun al-filaha (the law of farming) which listed mainly the
responsibilities of the farmers concerning different crops along with some
responsibilities of civil servants.41 Among the reasons for issuing that law was facing
the non-compliance of the shaykhs of the villages concerning conscription, however,
the law was not successful notwithstanding its harsh penalties.42 The failure of that
law regardless of the harsh penalties shows that punishment is not always effective in
reforming the civil service. Disciplinary procedures are one of the tools of reforming
the civil service but they are not always successful especially if applied alone.
Furthermore, the failure of that law because of the non-compliance of the shaykhs of
the villages shows how important the role of the civil servants was in applying the
policies of the government. Therefore, it was important for Mohamed Ali to find other
ways to implement his policies.
Mohamed Ali realized that without clear precise data about the population concerning
its size, age composition, locations, and professions, conscription could not succeed.43
To collect this data Mohamed Ali made many registers to write down the number of
conscripted men, their names, and their villages.44 He also made other registers to
include the number of houses and the numbers of its inhabitants.45 Furthermore, he

36

Id. at 100–104.
Id. at 100–104.
38
Id. at 100–104.
39
Id. at 100–104.
40
Id. at 104.
41
Gabriel Baer, Tanzimat in Egypt—the penal code, 26 BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND
AFRICAN STUDIES 2 (1963).
42
KHALED FAHMY, supra note 31 at 105.
43
Id. at 107.
44
Id. at 107.
45
Id. at 107.
37
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made a national census to know the number of residents.46 Holding the numerous
registers that were made and performing the census required a strong bureaucracy.47
Hence, in 1837, Mohamed Ali issued qanun al-siyasa al-malakiyya or the
Siyasatname law, which dealt primarily with the offenses of the civil servants.48 That
law was issued by Mohamed Ali to combat corruption and increase the efficiency of
the civil servants after a consultation with a French expert who wrote a report for that
purpose based on his interviews with high-ranking civil servants.49 Yet, this law did
not succeed in combating corruption of the civil servants because they used to pay
bribes to be appointed in their positions so they had to take advantage of their jobs
and earn as much as they could from it to compensate for what they had paid to be
appointed in the first place.50 That law did not only fail in combating the corruption of
the civil servants but also failed in solving the problem of inefficiency of the
government.51 The failure of that law points out how the organization of the civil
service affects its effectiveness. The method of choosing and appointing the civil
servants is much related to how they act later. So when corrupt civil servants are
responsible for choosing and appointing the new staff they do not choose the most
qualified personnel but choose corrupt people who pay bribes to be appointed and the
latter start rent-seeking activities to earn back what they have already paid to be
appointed.
In 1844, another law was passed organizing the civilian bureaucracy, especially,
holding, and keeping the registers.52 In 1847, Mohamed Ali asked the same French
expert to put another report to improve the situation of the government.53 The French
expert suggested setting an annual budget for the government and not allowing
departments of the government to exceed the limits of the budget. He also suggested
lowering the number of civil servants, introducing a new system for promotions, and
eliminating corporal punishment.54 Again, these new amendments failed to achieve

46

Id. at 107.
Id. at 109.
48
HỊLMĪ AHṂAD SHALABĪ, AL-MUWAZẒẠFŪN FĪ MISṚ : FĪ ʻASṚ MUHẠMMAD ʻALĪ, 71 (1989).
49
Raouf Abbas Hamed, The Siyasatname and the Institutionalization of Central Administration Under
Muhammad ’Ali, in THE STATE AND ITS SERVANTS , 79 (Nelly Hanna ed., 1995).
50
SHALABĪ, supra note 48 at 72.
51
Hamed, supra note 49 at 84.
52
KHALED FAHMY, supra note 31 at 109.
53
Hamed, supra note 49 at 84–85.
54
Id. at 85.
47
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the expected results; however, they remained applicable until the introduction of the
ministerial system in 1878.55

B. The Beginning of the Debt Crisis
From 1862, the number of civil servants in the Egyptian government continued
increasing due to the expansion of public works because of the production of cotton.
Cotton production led to many public works like building ports, enhancing irrigation
systems, and extension of railways. New civil servants were appointed to work in
these public projects and new administrative units were established to run the
projects.56
Ironically, 1862, the year the government started recruiting new civil servants, was
also the year when it could not pay their salaries because it needed to pay for 176
thousand shares of the Suez Canal company, which it had guaranteed to buy.57
Therefore, the government started taking loans from the Europeans. The first loan was
taken by Khedive Sa'id, and then Khedive Isma'il asked for more loans to finance the
public works.58 In 1875, it became clear that the Egyptian government is unable to
repay its debts and that led to the European intervention in the Egyptian
administration to make Egypt repay its debts.59
According to Robert Hunter, among the reasons for the Egyptian public debt was the
determination of the Khedive Sa'id, and the Khedive Isma'il to modernize Egypt by
using the Egyptian administration as the main tool to face the control of the foreign
merchants over the financial resources after breaking the monopoly that was practiced
by Mohamed Ali.60 To provide the Egyptian administration with the needed trained
men the Khedive Isma'il opened schools all over Egypt and sent youth to learn in
Europe.61 Isma'il also flourished the Egyptian industry by extending railways,
establishing a paper factory, a textile factory, seventeen sugar factories, and
enhancing irrigation systems among other things.62

55

Id. at 85.
F. ROBERT HUNTER, EGYPT UNDER THE KHEDIVES, 1805-1879: FROM HOUSEHOLD GOVERNMENT TO
MODERN BUREAUCRACY. 52 (Badr Alrefa’i tran., 2005 ed.).
57
Id. at 54.
58
Id. at 52–54.
59
Id. at 249.
60
Id. at 56.
61
Id. at 56.
62
Id. at 56.
56
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However, the revenues of the Egyptian government could not cover the expenses of
those projects.63 Hence, starting from the 1850s the government started issuing shortterm bonds followed by contracting eight loans from Europe secured with state
revenues but the revenues could not cover the debt.64 Therefore, Isma'il asked the
British to send two advisors to help in managing the state finances.65 Upon that
request, the British established the first fact-finding mission, which in turn resulted in
a French intervention.66 The negotiations between Egypt, Britain, and France
concerning the Egyptian debt resulted in the establishment of Caisse de la Dette
Publique (Commission of the Public Debt).67
The Commission could not function well because of some reasons that include the
competing points of view of the foreign creditors and insufficient Egyptian political
cooperation.68 However, one of the major obstacles that faced the Commission was its
inability to deal with the local information order because the Egyptian fiscal and
accounting systems were not similar to what the Europeans had back home.69 These
obstacles made the Europeans realize that dealing with the Egyptian situation through
the establishment of commissions was not fruitful.70 Hence, they figured out that a
comprehensive administrative reform would be the guarantee of debt repayment.71
Cromer alleges that England was not interested in occupying Egypt in order not to
damage its relationship with other European countries, but given the financial
situation in Egypt in 1879, it had to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt to ensure
that it is administered well to save the British interests in Egypt.72 Hence, the good
administration was not sought to help the Egyptian economy or make development in
Egypt but rather to save the British interests represented in debt repayment. This
means that, according to Cromer, the main goal of good administration or good
governance was collecting the debt.

63

Malak Labib, The Unforeseen Path of Debt Imperialism: Local Struggles, Transnational Knowledge,
and Colonialism in Egypt, in A WORLD OF PUBLIC DEBTS 157 (Nicolas Barreyre & Nicolas Delalande
eds., 2020), http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-48794-2_7 (last visited Mar 7, 2021).
64
Id. at 157.
65
Id. at 157.
66
Id. at 157.
67
Id. at 158–159.
68
Id. at 160.
69
Id. at 160.
70
Id. at 163.
71
Id. at 163.
72
THE EARL OF CROMER, MODERN EGYPT 157–158 (Sabry Mohamed Hasan tran., 2014).
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Cromer's theory about the British motive for occupying Egypt is just one of many
theories about the real motive behind the British occupation of Egypt. These theories
include the fear of the French challenge to the British supremacy in the region,
demands of the British industry to save the interests of the British merchants, and
saving the security of the Suez Canal.73 All these theories are centered on British
interests, whether based on strategic or economic considerations. This shows how the
reform of the civil service does not necessarily target the interest of the citizens who
deal with the civil service. Furthermore, the reform of the civil service does not have
to protect the interests of the people or enhance the civil service as a service provider
but in some cases, the reform targets the interests of the government or the reformer
who suggested the reform.
Cromer explains that the British noticed that the way the Egyptian government
governed Egypt was the main reason behind the deteriorating financial situation and
to change that situation some reforms must be introduced.74 They started by
identifying the reasons that led to the debt to decide the suitable reforms. The
identified reasons were the government intervention in the economy by playing a role
that is better to be assigned to the private sector,75 the bad tax system,76 and not
applying the existing laws.77 The recommended reforms were to restrain unnecessary
expenditures,78 reform the tax system,79 and use an annual budget.80 Hence, it was
necessary to reform the Egyptian administration to make it able to apply the reform
policy.81 It was also necessary to have efficient civil servants to apply these reforms.82
Therefore, in 1878, the ministerial system replaced the Khedive's Privy Council and
became responsible for applying the new policy.83 That institutional reform program
was a fundamental element of the creditor states' policy in Egypt to ensure that Egypt
repays its debts.84 Because these reforms were difficult for the Egyptians, the British
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suggested that they should be given some aids to mitigate the effects of the reform.85
The British also suggested that Egyptian citizens must be convinced of the importance
of the reform to obey the policies of the Europeans.86
The Europeans did not apply in Egypt a reform program to develop the country and
enhance its political, economic, and social situations. They did not apply the
principles they use in their own countries. The reform program aimed to make Egypt
repay its debt with no real interest in helping the country. Malak Labib explains that
The European-led “administrative revolution” made no room for an independent
parliamentary institution. As noted earlier, European critique of khedival rule was
made in reference to the liberal political model, and the discourse of financial
controllers and advisors such as Cromer, Wilson, and Blignères strongly emphasized
the link between the financial crisis and the “despotic” nature of the government …
Yet, in practice, it was a very different model that European administrators ultimately
sought to implement in the context of Egypt. [They sought] a policy based on the
collaboration of a small circle of local politicians, identified by their Western
financial advisors as “reformers.”87
However, the reform policy did not work well because Khedive Isma'il impeded the
council of ministers.88 According to Cromer, the Khedive proved that the Eastern
context must be taken into consideration when implementing the reform policy
because disregarding that context impedes the application of the policy even if it is a
good policy.89
In 1879, Khedive Isma'il Pasha was exiled from Egypt.90 Robert Hunter explains that
one of the reasons for the fall of the rule of Isma'il Pasha was the emergence of the
civil bureaucrats who became very powerful and shared Isma'il in ruling Egypt. He
adds that those high-ranking civil servants had their own interests either with the
ambassadors of the European countries or with Isma'il Pasha or with the people.91
In 1881, Sherif Pasha, the Egyptian prime minister, wrote a report to the Khedive
Tawfiq asking him to form a committee to propose a law that regulates the civil
service.92 Sherif Pasha wrote that the civil service needs attention from the
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government and laws should be enacted to organize recruitment and promotion of the
civil servants to protect them from any arbitrary powers that might hinder their
progress and promotions.93 Sherif Pasha added that the new laws should stipulate the
conditions for promotions and should grant periodical raises for non-promoted civil
servants.94 Therefore, a committee should be formed to indicate the stipulations for
appointment and promotions, categorize jobs into a hierarchy, and regulate the
disciplinary procedures for civil servants.95 The committee was formed and based on
its report issued the khedival high order dated 10 April 1883 regulating the civil
service in Egypt.96
The high order of 10 April 1883 organized appointing, promoting, and dismissing the
civil servants.97 The high order stipulated that in each ministry or department, a
council should be formed and to be called the administrative and disciplinary council
in addition to a unit for human resources.98 That council should have branches in the
different governorates and the decisions of those branches could be appealed before
the main council in the ministry while the decisions of the main council in the
ministry cannot be appealed.99 The high order also provided that for each civil servant
a file should be made to include his papers, previous jobs, previous reports concerning
his administrative behavior, and anything related to his service time.100 Furthermore,
the high order mentioned the possible disciplinary sanctions to be imposed on civil
servants, which include warning, deduction from salary for no more than fifteen days,
suspension, lowering the rank, and dismissal.101 The high order excluded the highranking civil servants from its application.102 It also stipulated that civil servants who
were dismissed by a judicial verdict cannot be appointed again in the civil service.103

93

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18.
95
Id. at 18.
96
Id. at 18.
97
ANṬŪN ṢAFĪR, MAJMŪʻAH TATAḌAMMAN JAMĪʻ AL-QAWĀNĪN WA-AL-LAWĀʼIḤ WA AL-QARĀRĀT ALMAʻMŪL BI-HĀ FĪ MIṢR WA KADHĀ AL-ITTIFĀQĀT AL-THUNĀʼĪYAH WA AL-MUʻĀHIDĀT AL-DAWLĪYAH
AL-MURTABIṬAH MIṢR BI-HĀ MAʻA AL-ISHĀRAH ILÁ AḤKĀM MAḤKAMATĪ AL-NAQD WA AL-QAḌĀʼ ALIDĀRĪ 1856 - 1952. LI-WĀḌIʻIHI AL-DUKTŪR ANṬŪN ṢAFĪR, MUḤĀM AMĀM MAḤKAMAT AL-NAQḌ WAMUSTASHĀR BI-MAJLIS AL-DAWLAH SĀBIQAN. 828 (1952).
98
Id. at 828.
99
Id. at 828.
100
Id. at 828.
101
Id. at 828.
102
Id. at 828.
103
Id. at 828.
94

15

Later it was amended by the khedival high order dated 24 May 1885 concerning
disciplinary procedures.104 That high order changed the name of the administrative
and disciplinary council to the disciplinary council.105 The high order gave the heads
of the different departments and institutions the power to inflect minor disciplinary
sanctions like warning and deduction from salary while preserving the more serious
sanctions to the disciplinary council.106 It also provided the regulations for
grievances.107 Furthermore, the high order formed a new council to decide when a
dismissed civil servant should be deprived of the pension.108 It limited the depravation
of the pension to the cases when the civil servant caused financial damage or was
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor.109
Then it was followed by supplementary khedival high order on 19 February 1887
concerning submitting the disciplinary procedures of high-ranking officials to an
administrative court.110 This high order formed a high administrative court subject to
the prime minister.111 The high administrative court was specialized in the cases
against high-ranking officials filed by the council of ministers when the former
committed financial violations.112 The verdict of the high administrative court was not
appealable.113
On 7 February 1888 was issued a high order concerning the dismissal of civil servants
and stipulated that dismissed civil servants should be handed the decision of their
dismissal.114
Later was issued the high order dated 24 December 1888 concerning the formation of
a high disciplinary court.115 Unlike the high administrative court, this court was
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specialized in cases against non-high-ranking civil servants concerning their
administrative work only.116 The court could dismiss civil servants with or without
depravation of pension without ruling over his civil and criminal liability.117
Then the decree dated 1 June 1893 regulating the ranks of the jobs in governorates.118
Then the decree dated 23 March 1901 concerning disciplinary sanctions for civil
servants, which were warning, deduction from salary for no more than a month,
suspension with no salary for no more than three months, lowering the rank, and
dismissal without depravation of pension.119 The decree stipulated that the heads of
the departments and institutions could only sanction their inferiors by warnings and
deduction from salary for no more than fifteen days while higher sanctions could only
be applied according to the applicable laws and high orders in that regard.120
On 24 June 1901 was issued a khedival decree ratifying the regulations of the
Egyptian and foreign civil servants in the Egyptian government along with temporary
workers. Then the law number 15 was issued on 15 May 1913 concerning the
financial rights of civil servants who were dismissed by disciplinary procedures.121
Then the decree dated 8 February 1920 concerning appointing civil servants by
decrees.122 Then the decree dated 22 September 1930 regulating the dismissal of civil
servants who were appointed by decrees.123 Those civil servants included deputy
ministers and their assistants, judges and prosecutors, counselors of the king and their
assistants, the general secretaries of ministries and the council of ministers, governors,
and the general managers whose annual salary is not less than 1750 Egyptian
pounds.124
Then was issued the decree dated 15 December 1941 concerning some disciplinary
sanctions for civil servants.125 Later, was issued law 210/1951, which represented a
new evolution in the history of the civil service laws in Egypt because it was
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comprehensive.126 It was comprehensive because it covered almost all the aspects
concerning the civil servants like appointment, promotion, and disciplinary
proceedings, instead of issuing a separate decree for each concern or aspect.
The succession of these decrees starting from the letter for Sherif Pasha in 1881
shows that they were issued for the sake of the civil servants. Sherif Pasha expressed
it clearly in his letter that civil servants need laws to protect them from any arbitrary
power. Hence, all the decrees were issued to protect the civil servants and grant them
raises and rewards. Although some decrees organized the disciplinary procedures for
the civil servants when they commit violations, they were issued as a protection for
the civil servants not as a way to increase the efficiency of the civil service.
Therefore, the administrative and disciplinary council was formed then it was
replaced by an administrative court to guarantee judicial protection for the civil
servants. The concept of the civil service as a provider of public services did not exist
in these decrees. The civil service was just a relationship between the civil servants
(the employees) and the government represented in the ruler (the employer).
Because these previous decrees came to provide the civil servants with protection and
grant them more financial rights, they cared for the personal interests of the civil
servants more than the civil service itself as an institution.127 Hence, it was necessary
to enact a new law to organize the civil service based on modern objective rules that
make a balance between the interests of the civil servants and the interests of the
government.128 In other words, there was a need to balance the relationship between
the employer and the employees. Therefore, in 1949, Egypt invited the British expert
A. P. Sinker (later Sir Paul Sinker) to study the Egyptian civil service and suggest
how to solve its problems. Sinker, who was the Director-General of the British
Council in Egypt and formerly the first civil service commissioner in the U.K, wrote
his report in which he pointed to the inflation of the size of the civil service and based
on that report was issued the law 210/1951 concerning the civil service.
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C. The Independence of Egypt and the Start of Development
Starting from 1952, the Egyptian government under Nasser's regime adopted policies
for expanding public industrial activities and nationalizing industries along with
providing social services and free education.129 Nasser's regime also adopted a full
employment policy for graduates.130 All these policies led to a serious increase in the
number of civil servants.131 That increase was in conformity with the role played by
the government in the economy at that time. "The administrative units grew from a
few dozens in 1952 to nearly 1600 administrative units in 1969. That included 29
ministries, 50 public authorities, 64 public organizations, 381 public companies, 6
independent bodies, 120 urban councils, and 1000 rural councils."132 Of course, the
increase in the number of administrative units was followed by an increase in the
number of civil servants. According to A. P. Sinker, 2.2% of the Egyptians worked in
the government and that consumed around 35% of the budget.133
There have been initiatives for reforming the civil service starting from 1951;
however, the primary tools of those initiatives were legislations and ad-hoc
committees. The results of those legislations were contradictory and overlapping
regulations. The final outcome was inefficient and disorganized civil service.134 Some
of those overlapping regulations created different institutions with overlapping
competence and jurisdiction. Therefore, in Egypt, concerning agencies with anticorruption powers, we can find four institutions responsible for conducting studies
about corruption and civil service, which are Transparency Unit, Transparency and
Integrity Committee, Information and Decision Support Center, and Central Auditing
Organization.135 Furthermore, there are five institutions responsible for detecting and
controlling corruption, which are the Administrative Control Authority, Central
Auditing Organization, Public Funding Investigation Police, Illegal Gains
Department, and Administrative Prosecution.136 Moreover, there are four institutions
129
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responsible for receiving complaints, which are Citizens Relations Management,
Administrative Control Authority, Illegal Gains Department, and Administrative
Prosecution.137 And there are five institutions responsible for conducting corruptionrelated investigations, which are Administrative Control Authority, Public Funds
Investigation Police, Public Prosecution, Illegal Gains Department, and
Administrative Prosecution.138 Finally, there are two institutions responsible for
prosecutions, which are Public Prosecution and Administrative Prosecution.139 The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) mentions the
overlapping jurisdiction and lack of cooperation between these institutions as the most
important reasons for their ineffectiveness in fighting corruption.140 However, in my
opinion, the most important reason for the ineffectiveness of these institutions in
fighting corruption is that they work on detecting violations more than working on
studying the reasons that led to the violation in the first place to change it. During
Nasser and Sadat's regimes, four institutions were created to detect and investigate
corruption – the Administrative prosecution, the Administrative Control Authority,
the Central Auditing Organization, and the Illegal Gains Department – while there
was no single institution whose main purpose was to conduct studies about corruption
until the creation of the Information and Decision Support Center in 1985 during
Mubarak's regime.141 This pattern is not new in the history of reforming the Egyptian
civil service, as mentioned earlier the first initiative by Mohamed Ali when he issued
qanun al-filaha (the law of farming) failed notwithstanding the harsh penalties.142
Mohamed Ali's second initiative when he issued qanun al-siyasa al-malakiyya or the
Siyasatname law, which dealt primarily with the offenses of the civil servants143 also
did not succeed in combating corruption of the civil servants because it did not change
the causes of the corruption.144 The reform should address the root cause of the
corruption, not just arrest or terminate the violators.
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One of the methods of reforming the civil service is worth shedding the light on. This
method is establishing the Administrative Prosecution by the law 480/1954 to
improve the accountability of the civil servants.
The goal of establishing the Administrative Prosecution is to guarantee the integrity
and independence of the administrative investigations.145 This fulfills a twofold goal.
First, the administrative prosecutor is not subordinate to the head of the institution
within which the investigation occurs, which means that the prosecutor is not afraid of
retaliation in case the convicted person was a high-ranking official. The second goal is
to protect low-ranking officials from being arbitrarily tried by their superiors.146 The
role of the Administrative Prosecution is similar to the role of the Administrative
Inspection Bureau (AIB) in Japan or the Swedish ombudsman or French mediator and
the parliamentary commissioner systems in other countries.
The law of Administrative Prosecution 480/1954 was amended later by Law
117/1958. According to the explanatory note of Law 117/1958, the competence or the
jurisdiction of the Administrative Prosecution was limited under Law 480/1954
because it was a new method of reform but since that method proved to be efficient,
the legislator is encouraged to expand its jurisdiction.147 Therefore, the jurisdiction of
the Administrative prosecution was expanded again by Law 19/1959 to cover public
organizations and institutions. Then later the president of Egypt issued decision
number 1456/1959 expanding the jurisdiction of the Administrative Prosecution over
public companies, and in 1960 the president issued decree number 2062 expanding
the jurisdiction of the Administrative Prosecution over some associations. Due to the
success of the Administrative Prosecution in the field of accountability and
disciplinary procedures for civil servants, the legislator expanded its jurisdiction
again. Hence, issued law number 115/1983 making the Administrative Prosecution
the only institution competent with investigating with high-ranking civil servants
along with other exclusive powers for the Administrative Prosecution to make it
powerful before administrative units. Expansion of the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Prosecution continued by the laws number 203/1991 and 142/1994.148
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The importance of the role of the Administrative Prosecution stems from the fact that
it performs a role that otherwise would not be properly performed. The
Administrative Prosecution, being an ombudsperson body, fulfills the objectives of
accountability, which are improving the quality of administration, protecting the
rights of citizens dealing with the administration, and increasing the legitimacy of the
government.
Although the role of the government was diminished in the seventies after the
adoption of the open-door economic policy,149 the increase of the number of the civil
servants continued under its own momentum.150 That continuous increase because of
the recruitment of graduates policy represented a problem to the government in the
seventies because the role of the government was diminishing giving more space to
the market economy and making less need to a large civil service.151 Yet, altering that
policy by leaving the employment of the educated youth subject to the market would
create a social and political dilemma.152 By the mid-seventies, the government
became aware that the inflated inefficient civil service represented an obstacle in front
of the open door economic policy as it was frequently highlighted by the then Prime
Minister Mamduh Salim.153
According to the explanatory note of Law 47/1987 that was written by Mamduh
Salim, Law 210/1951 was issued to regulate the civil service based on objective rules
instead of the previous ones that were subjective and serving the interests of the civil
servants more than the state.154 The private interest of the civil servants was clear in
the rules concerning pricing the certificates.155 These rules set certain salaries and
compensations for civil servants based on their educational certificates regardless of
the job they were performing.156 Hence, it was normal to find two civil servants doing
the same job but receiving different salaries because they had different certificates.157
However, the Egyptian government could not stop that system because of the power
of the civil servants as an interest group. Not only the government could not stop that
149

Ayubi, supra note 1 at 288.
Id. at 288.
151
Id. at 289–290.
152
Id. at 289–290.
153
Id. at 295.
154
The explanatory note of Law 47/1978, supra note 127.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
150

22

system, but it also enacted Law 371/1953 that ensures the continuity of that system of
pricing the certificates.158 That law was meant to apply for a short period until the
issuance of Law 46/1964 but the Law 46/1964, which came to represent the social
ideology of that time, did not stop that system.159 Yet, Law 158/1964 and 26/1966
were issued to keep the pricing system in place even after the issuance of the civil
service law number 58/1971.160 Because the civil service laws kept responding to the
requests of the civil servants, a system existed where the private interests competed
with the public interests.161 The succession of these laws that enacted financial
exceptions for the system of pricing the certificates shows how civil servants can be
an interest group that interferes in the decisions of the state including the laws
concerning reforming the civil service. Hence, it was necessary to issue a new law to
regulate the civil service based on objective rules, and to that end was issued Law
47/1978.162
Given the vital role played by the civil service throughout history in helping different
governments and foreign creditors to implement their policies, and given the
continuous inflation in its size along with its inefficiency, Egypt's partners from
international organizations and international financial institutions became interested in
reforming the Egyptian civil service. The World Bank and the IMF cooperate with
Egypt to enhance governance and boost economic growth. Hence, each institution
studied the Egyptian situation and wrote reports diagnosing the causes of the poor
performance of the Egyptian civil service and prescribing how to enhance and
improve it.

D. The IMF's and the World Bank's Reform Strategy of the
Egyptian Civil Service
1. The IMF's Reform Strategy:
According to Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral
discussions with its members every year.163 In its discussion with Egypt in 2014, the
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IMF went through the difficult situation of the Egyptian economy after the revolution
of 2011. The discussion identified the reasons behind the double-digit budget deficits
as the delayed reforms, low revenue, and rising wages and subsidies.
The report of the discussions highlights the procedures that have been taken by Egypt
to reduce the fiscal deficit. The report states,
The government recently set a ceiling for public sector wages, subjected bonuses to
income taxes and discontinued the automatic inclusion of bonuses in basic wages after
five years. New hires have been centralized and require approval by the finance
ministry, and the use of public entities’ own resources for additional rewards to
employees has been discontinued. The authorities are also working on a thorough
revision of the public pay system and introducing an attrition scheme limiting the
number of retirees to be replaced.164
However, further steps need to be taken to control the wage bill.165
On November 11, 2016, the IMF approved a three-year extended arrangement under
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to grant Egypt about US$ 12 billion to support the
economic reform program.166 The program should help Egypt restore macroeconomic
stability and promote growth. The identified challenges of the Egyptian economy that
the program is going to address include a balance of payment problem, foreign
exchange shortage, large budget deficits, and low growth with high unemployment.167
The large budget deficits led to rising public debt, and to reduce the fiscal deficits, the
government should apply certain policies. These policies are the introduction of VAT,
reducing energy subsidies, and the optimization of the public sector wage bill.168
The optimization of the public sector wage bill should be applied through strict hiring
rules and civil service reform.169 The IMF claims that the civil service reform to be
applied is a break from the past because it is designed to reverse the growth of the
public wage bill.170 According to the IMF, this reverse effect is expected to happen
through: " a) the new budget law eliminates indexation of bonuses and allowances of
public employees and defines them in nominal terms as opposed to a percentage of
164

Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
166
International Monetary Fund, Request for Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility,
IMF PRESS RELEASE No. 16/501 1 (2016).
167
Id. at 1.
168
Id. at 2.
169
Id. at 13.
170
Id. at 18.
165

24

the base salary before; b) the current practice of scrutinizing new hiring and not
automatically filling vacant positions; c) the new civil service law, passed by
Parliament in August, will modernize the entire public employment framework."171
In the First Review under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility, published in September 2017, it was acknowledged that some savings have
been made due to the wage bill reforms but still, more should be done.172
In the Second Review under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility, published in January 2018, again lowering public wages was considered
fruitful and should be maintained, regardless of the local pressures to increase the
wages.173
The Third Review under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund
Facility, published in July 2018, continued the plan of the program concerning the
wage bill, which is reducing the wage bill through the "containment of the growth of
base salaries, tight control of bonuses and allowances, control on the hiring process,
and continuing modernization of the public employment framework in line with the
new civil service law, passed by Parliament in August 2016."174 The Fourth Review
under the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility, published in
April 2019, followed the same path as the previous reviews.175
In October 2019, the IMF completed the fifth and final review under the Extended
Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility. Concerning the public wage bill, the
review mentioned that Egypt is about to achieve the target of the program.176
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2. The World Bank's Strategy:
Egypt is a World Bank member since 1945.177 Since then the World Bank has been
assisting Egypt in improving its economic performance. In 2005, the World Bank
published its report on the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) with Egypt for the
period FY06-FY09. The Bank proposed to help Egypt achieve its development
objectives, which are high and sustainable GDP growth and alleviation of poverty.
These objectives are to be achieved through the private sector with a complementary
role from the public sector. The complementary role of the public sector is to be
accomplished by improving the provision of public services such as infrastructure,
health, education, and macroeconomic stability.178
The plan to enhance macroeconomic stability was to control the fiscal deficit by
reducing public expenditures and increasing public revenues. To reduce expenditures
plans were set to control appointing civil servants and to cut subsidies and
unnecessary expenditures in the government.179
Since the quality of the human resources in the civil service and the cost of keeping a
large size civil service affect the quality of the provided public services, the World
Bank set plans to enhance that situation. The plans include contracting out some
public services, limiting new hiring, long-term and short-term contracts for new hires
instead of permanent employment, and increasing accountability through performance
monitoring systems.180
Education in Egypt is one of the public services that need to be enhanced to achieve
the development objectives.181 The Bank noticed that most of the budget of the
education goes to the salaries of the teachers and the administrative staff, which
leaves little for investment and maintenance. Nevertheless, all are paid low salaries
and that represents an obstacle for improving the quality of the service, a problem that
exists concerning other public services too.182
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Enhancing the health service in Egypt is also an important factor to achieve the
development objectives. Egypt faces a big challenge of providing health care to the
poor while raising the quality and efficiency of the service. Therefore, the Bank
advised the government to "(a) improve the quality and efficiency of the existing
government health care delivery system by reducing fragmentation, introducing
greater managerial autonomy and accountability, and contracting of services where
appropriate; (b) place greater emphasis on prevention and primary care; and (c)
enhance management of public funds."183
Ten years later, since the earlier report of 2005, in 2015, in the Bank's report for
Egypt for the period FY 2015-2019, the Bank acknowledges that political, social, and
economic reforms have been applied, yet more needs to be done.184 Although Egypt
has implemented reforms to reduce the fiscal deficit through controlling the wage bill
and increasing revenues, the fiscal deficit remains and its reform policies need to be
continued.185 Therefore, Egypt's strategy for sustainable development is focused on
three main points: economic development, improving governance, and social
justice.186 The Bank's support for this strategy is focused on improving governance
among other points.187 Improving governance should happen by enhancing
transparency and efficiency of the public institutions through increasing the citizens'
ability to hold the state accountable by giving feedback on the quality of the services
provided by public institutions.188
The Bank explains that governance is important because it strengthens the
relationship between the state and the citizens, and because it leads to achieving
sustainable growth and reducing poverty.189 Improving governance in Egypt shall
happen through a new civil service law. Therefore,
In March 2015, [the Egyptian government] issued Law 18/2015 on Civil Service,
replacing Law 47 of 1978 regulating the recruitment, dismissal, promotion of civil
servants, as well as performance-related salary-increases, leave options, and bonuses.
The new law is a central element in the ambitious action plan of the Ministry of
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Planning and Administrative Reform190 to introduce performance measurement
criteria and for meritocratic recruitment and promotion of staff. The action plan also
includes actions to reduce graft and steps towards improving the responsiveness and
quality of public services. These measures should contribute to greater accountability
in service delivery and more efficient PIM [Public Investment Management system]
in the medium to long term.191
Civil service reform is considered a fundamental step towards reducing the chronic
fiscal deficit.192 To reduce that chronic deficit, some measures have been undertaken
regarding the wage bill of the civil service, which include setting a limit for bonuses
and rewards and preventing the automatic increase of the salary by delinking variable
payments from basic salary.193 In addition to that, a three-year plan was set for
administrative reform to combat corruption and enhance the efficiency of the civil
service. The plan aspires to "(i) streamline the legal framework of all public
administration units/bodies; (ii) enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of public
administrative bodies and the quality of public services; (iii) enhance the capacity of
civil servants; (iv) reinforce equity and transparency of public services; (v) strengthen
accountability and citizen engagement; and (vi) ensure efficient management of
public assets and buildings by establishing a unified database."194
According to the Bank, low levels of transparency and accountability, and the absence
of sanctions make it hard for individuals and entrepreneurs to gain access to public
services or hold civil servants accountable.195 Therefore, citizens should be equipped
with mechanisms that enable them to provide feedback on the quality of the services
to improve the accountability of the civil servants and to increase the citizens' trust in
the public institutions.196 For instance, the absence of parent meetings and weak
supervision over the performance of the teachers in Egyptian public schools means
that they are immune from being fired or disciplined for poor performance. This in
turn negatively affects the educational process by resulting in teacher absenteeism and
less teaching time in classrooms.197
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Poor governance and lack of citizens' engagement in monitoring the quality of the
public services, which lead to absenteeism, are not exclusive to the education sector
but also exist in the health sector.198 In another work published by the Bank, it was
noted, "Public sector teachers and health workers tend to offer some services as
private efforts for a fee, which can create a conflict of interest. In Egypt, for example,
89 percent of private physicians also work in public facilities where they may be
absent or extend little effort during official hours while giving their best performance
at their private practice."199 According to the Bank, the reasons behind absenteeism
are low pay, weak supervision, and lack of meaningful job content. Since the
administrative unit productivity is low, absenteeism is not a problem.200
To improve the fiscal management, Egypt requested a proposed programmatic
Development Policy Financing (DPF) from the Bank.201 The main points of the
Bank's policy are "(i) advancing fiscal consolidation, through higher revenue
collection, moderating the growth in the wage bill, and strengthening debt
management; (ii) ensure sustainable energy supply through private sector
engagement; and (iii) enhance the business environment by facilitating investment
laws, simplifying industrial licensing requirements and increasing competition."202 As
usual, controlling the wage bill is a fundamental element in reducing the fiscal deficit.
The importance of the civil service wages and performance for improving governance
led the Bank to prepare a report dedicated to public employment and governance in
Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. The objective of the report is to study the dynamic of
the civil service to understand the reasons behind the growth of the wage bill and its
effect on the quality of the performance.203 To achieve that objective, the report
reviews the previous reform programs to extract lessons concerning a better control of
the public wage bill and improving the efficiency of the government.204
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The report explains that the problem of the civil service in Egypt started in the 1960s
when the "public sector job was considered the right of every Egyptian."205 Since then
the Egyptian civil service has kept growing. In 1987, there were 1.6 million civil
servants and by 2008, the number reached 5.7 million civil servants.206 The main
reason behind the public employment growth, according to the report, is political.207
Political leaders used recruitment in the civil service as a reward for supporters, or to
please the public, or for social protection purposes by creating jobs in the civil service
regardless of actual need.208 Other reasons behind the public employment growth
include allowing new hires beyond the limits of the budget, and poor application of
staff performance assessment systems.209 In addition to that, people prefer public jobs
because they are less demanding and more rewarding than private-sector jobs.
Moreover, public jobs provide high job security, low possibility of dismissal, and they
are considered more respectable.210 The large size of the civil service does not only
constitute a burden on the budget because of the large wage bill but also the larger it
is the greater its power as an interest group protecting its own rights.211
The high job security and the low possibility of dismissal come from the fact that the
civil service law provides for a tenured civil service, with strong guarantees against
arbitrary dismissal.212 The tenured civil service or career-based civil service means
that employees are not hired to perform a certain job but given a rank within a
hierarchy. Later they are promoted based on rank and seniority instead of merit and
performance.213 To change the permanent status of the career-based civil service, the
Egyptian government started hiring employees using short-term contracts according
to Law 47/1978. However, the Parliament later changed the law to allow converting
the short-term contract into a tenured service after three years.214
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Formally, promotion requires an annual performance assessment but in fact, the
assessment is meaningless since there is no job description.215 Therefore, performance
assessments are used as rewards, and because of the low wage, managers give all their
staff high scores to allow them to receive the bonus that is tied to the assessment.216
Hence, 97% of the Egyptian civil servants are rated "excellent."217 Linking
promotions to rank and seniority blocks the way before the younger energetic staff
and creates weak incentives for better performance.218
Although previous civil service laws employed competitiveness based on educational
qualifications, informal selection approaches through connections and patronage
existed as well.219 The Bank expects the new civil service law (Law 18 of 2015) to
counter the informal selection approaches by running a nationwide entry exam.220
The report states that civil service reform initiatives and programs usually start by
reviewing and revising the existing laws, which results in periodic new laws without a
major change in the civil service.221 The report adds that the existing civil service
laws already require merit for appointments and promotions, which means that it is
not the absence of the legal framework, which is responsible for the public wage bill
growth and poor performance but the content of the laws and the way they are
applied.222 Creating a gap between the law and its application, especially in areas such
as appointments, promotions, and performance assessments makes the provisions of
the law that stipulate merit inoperative.223
The report continues,
What is striking for all of [public service reform initiatives] is that the diagnosis on
which they are based is not new. Most of the problems they are addressing were
recognized several decades ago and featured in earlier, if not sustained, reform
programs. Reformers have long recognized the inadequacies of the staff performance
assessment process, and the negative consequences for merit based promotion and
entity performance. Another target of reform has been pay structures, acknowledging
that base pay is too low and allowances too numerous and nontransparent. There is
215
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also recognition that organizational structures have proliferated and staffing levels are
too high – though without a clear picture of what staff are doing, it is impossible to
tell whether a department is overstaffed and by how much.224
The Bank noticed that the previous initiatives for civil service reform looked like each
other. They were based on the same diagnosis and prescribed the same solutions for
decades. They kept amending civil service laws without noticing that the problem lies
in the application, not the law itself. They recognized that the staffing levels are too
high. They also recognized that the pay is too low and allowances too numerous and
nontransparent, along with inadequate staff performance assessments. Therefore, the
Bank proposed what the government should do to reform the civil service.225 The
government should reduce the wage bill.226 It should freeze new hiring and restrain
pay awards even if the salary of critical categories of staff remains lower than the
private sector.227 It should do systematic assessments of skills in terms of the required
tasks.228 It should amend the civil service law to allow for early retirement, voluntary
retirement, and retrenchment.229 It should also enhance citizens' engagement by
providing them with the opportunity to give feedback on the service.230

E. Concluding Remarks
Tracing the history of the civil service in Egypt shows that the different rulers and the
foreign creditors used it for different purposes. Mohamed Ali used it to support
conscription while Isma'il used it to run the expanding public projects. The British
and French creditors used the civil service to apply their administrative reform for the
sake of debt repayment. To that end, they wanted to minimize the role of the state in
the economy and maximize the role of the private sector. However, their plan failed,
according to Cromer, because they disregarded the Eastern context and did not
consider the local political factors.
Then Nasser used the civil service to support the expanding public industrial activities
and nationalizing industries along with providing employment for graduates. Sadat
adopted the open-door economic policy, which meant that he wanted to diminish the
role of the state and give more space to the market economy; hence, he did not need a
224
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large civil service. However, he kept using the civil service for providing the young
educated graduates with jobs to avoid social and political problems.
Finally, the World Bank and the IMF set plans for the civil service reform based on
the concept of good governance. They wanted to minimize the role of the state and to
give more space to the private sector; hence, they found that there is no need for a big
civil service but unlike Sadat, they did not care for the social and political factors and
chose to control the public wage growth and to downsize the civil service. This fact
suggests the existence of a slight similarity between the reform strategy of the World
Bank and the IMF and the reform strategy of the British and French creditors, which
failed, according to Cromer, because of disregarding the local political factors. This
similarity raises a concern about the reasons that made the World Bank and the IMF
reapply a previously failed reform strategy. Therefore, in the following chapter, I
explore the concept of good governance and its relationship with the civil service.
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III.
Good Governance
The World Bank's and the IMF's reform strategy of the Egyptian civil service is based
on their concept of good governance. Hence, to understand why they chose this
reform strategy we need to understand the concept of good governance and its
relationship with the civil service.

A. History and Evolution
International financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank, provide states with loans and policies to promote development. The
policies are provided as the conditions to grant the loans. Since the 1980s and until
now, good governance is a part of the conditions of those institutions to grant loans.
According to them, good governance is important for the states to achieve
development. To understand what they mean by good governance, it is important to
go through the historical evolution of the concept.
In the 1960s, 1970s, and the beginning of the 1980s, development policies were stateled and focused on strengthening public institutions to lead the economy and make
them able to apply the development policies.231 As these policies did not succeed, the
reasons for their failure became a rich field for studies. In a conference on the Latin
American debt crisis, the economist John Williamson submitted a ten-point policy to
help developing states achieve development. The policy is based on the ideas of freemarket capitalism.232 Government intervention in the market was identified by
neoliberal economists as the reason behind the failure of development policies of the
previous decades that were state-centric. Hence, they suggested a market-centric
approach instead of the state-centric approach.233 The market-centric approach is
based on governance through the market.234 Governance through the market means
that allowing competition, supply and demand, and price mechanisms to govern the
markets and lead the development without government intervention and its arbitrary,
corrupt public officials and civil servants.235 That policy, which is submitted by John
Williamson, was supported by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
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Inter-American Development Bank, and the US Executive, and since all of them are
located in Washington, it was called the Washington Consensus.236 After Washington
Consensus, the IMF and the World Bank started adopting structural adjustment
policies in their aid conditions. These policies focused on boosting economic growth
and minimizing the role played by the state in the economy.237
Following plan-economy instead of market-economy was identified by neoliberal
economists as the reason behind the slow economic growth in the 1960s and the
1970s. Hence, they found the separation between politics and economy to be the ideal
solution for economic growth. The problem with the state intervention in the
economy, according to neoliberal economists, is that the state seeks to redistribute the
wealth in the society.238 It does so through taxes, but with time, taxes become punitive
and this, in turn, distorts the incentive structure of the market economy.239
Consequently, people lose interest in working and this leads to the decline of the total
production.240 This is because they have lost the desire to work and this in turn
negatively affects the economy as it causes a decline in total production.241 Therefore,
the state should abstain from intervening in the economy. The good state then is a
state that knows the limits of its role and separates between the fields where it should
interfere and the fields that are out of its scope. A state that is independent of
exploitation by interest groups and equipped with highly skilled civil servants who are
small in number and have ethics.242
Although the new policies, which are market-centric, were set to fix the failure of the
previous policies, which were state-centric, they did not make the expected success.243
They neither made economic growth nor reduced poverty. They even damaged the
welfare of the societies where they were applied.244 Among the obstacles identified by
the World Bank that led to the failure of the market-led policies were poor public
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administration and a crisis of governance.245 Therefore, the importance of the role of
the state and its institutions was recognized by the World Bank. Hence, the World
Bank changed the old concept of a minimal state or watchperson state to an effective
state.246 In this phase, governance policies focused on the public institutions for the
benefit of the market. "Key aspects of the agenda for governance development and
reforms included: rule of law, such as the enforcement of contracts and property
rights; eliminating corruption and other rent-seeking activities; transparency in public
services to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; reducing uncertainties and instability
in the economic and political environment; ensuring efficient public services for basic
social services such as schools and healthcare centers."247 The World Bank realized
that markets cannot work alone without government because they may not be able to
provide sound incentive structures. Therefore, the markets should be supported by
effective institutions to promote growth. Instead of dismantling the state or making a
rigid separation between the government and the market, they are seen now as
complementing each other.248
This new interest in the role of the state to support the market is explained by Kerry
Rittich as she states, "because transaction costs, information deficiencies and
incomplete markets are pervasive rather than exceptional, the conditions under which
pure market solutions are optimally efficient rarely obtain in practice. Consequently,
correcting market inefficiencies through various mechanisms, including state
regulation, would appear to be crucial to arguments about the superiority of
market allocation of resources."249 However, since neoliberal economists believed
that the failure of development policies in the 1960s and 1970s was due to
government intervention, they became skeptical of any kind of government
intervention. They are constantly alarmed by the inefficiency of state institutions, and
their regulations to correct market failure. Therefore, they thought about good
governance and best practices as means to make the government intervention marketfriendly. The neoliberal policy of good governance and best practices focused on
combating corruption and reforming government institutions to promote economic
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growth.250 Consequently, government institutions should be downsized and it should
support the private sector instead of impairing it.251 In addition to that, the traditional
services provided by the state should be contracted out.252 The result of this new
approach is a shift in the definition of good governance. This calls us to explore the
definition of governance.

B. Defining Good Governance:
According to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), there are 17 different definitions for "governance" and the term is used by
international organizations interchangeably with the term "good governance."253
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as "the
exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country's
affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and, institutions through
which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet
their obligations, and mediate their differences."254
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines
good governance as "the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society
in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic
development"255
The Institute of Governance in Ottawa explains, "Governance comprises the
institutions, processes, and conventions in a society which determine how power is
exercised, how important decisions affecting society are made, and how various
interests are accorded a place in such decisions."256
The Commission on Global Governance defines it as "the sum of the many ways
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs."257
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UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, "good governance is ensuring respect for
human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy; promoting transparency
and capacity in public administration."258
The IMF differentiates between governance and good governance. It explains that the
term "governance" is a neutral term that refers to the means through which a country
exercises governmental authority and manages public resources, notwithstanding the
outcome of these processes, while the term "good governance" is not neutral but
acknowledges the relationship between the quality of governance and its
effectiveness.259 The IMF continues to explain that there is no single definition for
"good governance" and each international organization defines the term according to
its mandate.260 Because the goodness of the governance covers economic, social, and
political fields, the different definitions of good governance reflect the mandates of
the international organizations that put them.261 International organizations that
recognize the inseparability of politics from "good governance" have integrated
politics in its definition, while those, which their mandate forbids interfering with
politics, opted for policy-neutral definitions.262
The World Bank defines good governance as "the manner in which power is exercised
in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development."263
The Bank tried avoiding interference with politics and focusing only on technical
matters, according to its mandate that bans interfering with politics, but with time, the
Bank became more open to dealing with politics as it acknowledged that the
economic sphere of governance depends on the quality of governance.264 Therefore,
the Bank started applying new policies for governance reform, such as civil service
reform.265
The first time the Bank addressed the poor public administration as one of the reasons
that affect the economic performance was in a 1989 report titled Sub-Saharan Africa:
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From Crisis to Sustainable Growth.266 But reforming the public administration, which
includes the civil service reform, raised legal questions because the Articles of
Agreement of the Bank bans political interference and bans considering noneconomic factors while reforming public administration is considered a political
issue.267 The answer to this dilemma was provided by Ibrahim Shihata who was the
Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank.268 Shihata explained that the
Article of Agreements of the Bank prohibits it from using the political system in a
given country as a criterion for lending.269 It also prohibits the Bank from using
conditionality to make political changes in the borrowing countries except, according
to Shihata, when the political factors affect the economy.270 In this case, the Bank has
the right to consider the political factors and even to change these factors to guarantee
the good application of its programs.271 In other words, the end justifies the means; as
long as the end is economic there is no problem in dealing with politics. The
economic considerations should be the only motive for the Bank's interference in
politics. In this case, the Bank has not violated its Articles of Agreement.
The World Bank has set six aggregate governance indicators to measure governance
within states; they are called Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).272 The
indicators evaluate six elements of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The Bank explains the role of each
indicator as follows:
1. Voice and Accountability (VA): measures the citizens' ability to select their
government, along with their freedom of expression and association, and free
media.273
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV): measures the possibility of
destabilizing the government or overthrowing it by unconstitutional means.274
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3. Government Effectiveness (GE): measures the quality of the public services
provided to the citizens by the government, the quality of the civil service, and
the independence of the civil service from political interference and pressure.
It also measures the ability of the government to formulate policies, and its
ability to implement such policies.275
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ): measures the ability of the government to formulate
and apply policies related to the promotion of private sector development.276
5. Rule of Law (RL): measures the level of confidence in and abidance by the
rules of society, especially the quality of property rights, contract enforcement,
the police, and the courts.277
6. Control of Corruption (CC): This indicator measures the level of corruption,
whether petty or grand corruption.278
According to the previous indicators, the quality of the civil service, the quality of the
public services provided by the civil service, and the independence of the civil service
are very important for governance. Combating corruption and accountability as well is
vital for governance. Therefore, international organizations and international financial
institutions involved in reforming governance have set policies for reforming the civil
service, combating corruption of public officials and civil servants, and increasing
their accountability. Hence, there is a need to understand the relationship between
governance and civil service.

C. Governance and Civil Service for the World Bank and the IMF
In a report by the Public Sector Management and Information Technology Team of
the World Bank, the importance of a sound civil service is linked to five areas:
governance, production and distribution of public goods and services, economic
policy, fiscal policy implementation, and fiscal sustainability.279 The size and quality
of the civil service are important factors in the analysis of public production of public
goods and services.280 Also, an efficient tax system is highly dependent on skilled and
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motivated civil servants.281 In addition to that, the size of the wage bill of the civil
service is important for fiscal sustainability.282 When the size of the civil service is
inflated, its wage bill represents a fiscal burden on the state.283 Hence, downsizing
should be done efficiently. Not only the reduction of the wage bill is important but
also how this reduction is managed.284
The report explains that an efficient, skilled civil service is an essential requirement
for good governance, which is fundamental for development.285 One of the many
reasons for the excellent economic performance in East Asia is a strong civil
service.286 The strong civil service in East Asia is also one of the reasons they
managed to realize economic growth notwithstanding the authoritarian regimes.287
The report adds that the size and quality of the civil service are fundamental in the
analysis of public production to secure the production of public goods and services.288
In other words, having a proper number of qualified civil servants is an important
factor in producing public goods and services.
According to the report, there are two types of economic policy reforms: enabling
reforms and affirmative reforms.289 Affirmative reforms, like improving public
expenditure management, depend on efficient civil servants for their implementation.
We can formulate excellent economic policies and reform programs but they are
useless without competent civil servants to implement them.290
The fact that efficient, skilled civil servants are a fundamental requirement for the
implementation of sound economic policies and reform programs is again stressed in
a working paper by the International Monetary Fund titled The Quality of
Governance: "Second-Generation" Civil Service Reform in Africa.291 The paper
concludes that it is important to attract talented Africans to work in the governments
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of their own countries to apply the reform programs that were set for African states.292
A study published by the World Bank also acknowledges the fact that the lack of
skilled civil servants in the African governments is a major reason behind the failure
of the implementation of good reform programs.293 Additionally, the civil service
needs to be corrupt-free to function properly.

D. Corruption in the Civil Service:
There is no single definition for corruption.294 The World Bank defines corruption as
"the abuse of public office for private gains."295 This definition is adopted by the IMF
and Transparency International as well,296 and it conforms with the provisions of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption.297 The IMF explains that this
definition is concerned with the acts of public officials and civil servants only while
the illegal acts committed by private citizens fall outside its scope.298 The definition
covers financial and non-financial gains by civil servants.299 Therefore, when a civil
servant awards a contract to a certain company because one of his/her relatives owns
this company, this is considered a corrupt act that falls under the definition of
corruption because it entails abuse of power for private gains.300
According to the IMF, corruption affects good governance negatively and this in turn
badly affects economic growth.301 Corruption distorts the sound application of laws
and implementation of policies; this is when the civil servants responsible for that
application and implementation are corrupt.302 In this case, bribery, for instance, will
determine the decisions of those corrupt civil servants instead of laws and
regulations.303
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The World Bank differentiates between two types of corruption: state capture, and
administrative corruption.304 State capture refers to the acts of individuals, groups, and
firms to formulate policies for their private gain by enacting laws and regulations for
that end through corrupt public officials.305 On the other hand, administrative
corruption refers to the intentional wrong application of laws and regulations to
provide private gains for public and private actors.306
In a World Bank staff working paper concerning the effects of corruption on
administrative performance, David J. Gould and Jose A. Amaro-Reyes list five
reasons for administrative and bureaucratic corruption.307 The first of which is the
government intervention in the development process because this provides
opportunities for civil servants to abuse their powers for private gains.308 The second
is the instability and unresponsiveness of the political system because under such
systems civil servants seek quick private gains rather than devotion for serving the
public.309 The third is certain socioeconomic factors that affect the behavior of the
civil servants, like poverty and inequity.310 The fourth is some cultural norms like
kinship loyalty, which affects the public's perception of the government and the
actions of the civil servants.311 The fifth is organizational factors, like human resource
management, accountability, and low salaries.312

E. Combating Corruption in the Civil Service:
Since neoliberal economists and international financial institutions recognized
government intervention in the market by its corrupt civil servants as an impediment
to economic growth, mechanisms of combating corruption are directed towards civil
servants and public officials to make the role played by the government corrupt-free,
along with minimizing the role of the government.313
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Although the importance of the role of the government is now acknowledged, for
neoliberal economists it is still better to limit this role as much as possible. They view
the discretionary power of civil servants as one of the root causes of corruption.314
Hence, it is important to diminish the discretionary power of civil servants to combat
corruption. Therefore, if the laws and regulations require companies to obtain a
license from the government before they operate or import certain products, civil
servants who are in charge of deciding which company gets the license could abuse
their discretionary power in taking this decision. Consequently, to avoid this corrupt
intervention, the government should not require acquiring the license in the first
place.315 However, not requiring a license is not the ideal solution for this problem.
The government could use a committee instead of a single civil servant for this
mission along with clear precise regulations to minimize the discretionary power of
the committee of the civil servants and to ensure that the companies follow the
required standards.
Another point raised by Shang-Jin Wei as a root cause of corruption is the vagueness
of laws.316 The vaguer the law is the more discretionary power the civil servants have
in applying the law. For instance, when tax laws are vague and hard to comprehend,
this gives the civil servants responsible for its application a wide discretionary power
concerning its application and this leads to corruption.317
Since corruption is highly related to civil servants and their actions, the quality of the
civil servants being qualified to perform the roles assigned to them is one of the
factors related to combating corruption.318 The higher the quality of the civil servants
the less corruption we have. The way they are recruited, promoted, and how much
they are paid determine their quality.319 They should be appointed based on their skills
and experience not based on nepotism and patronage. Their promotion also should be
merit-based not through connections. Otherwise, this internal corruption will be
reflected in their performance when implementing laws and regulations.320 In addition
314
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to that, giving civil servants high salaries is also one of the ways to combat
corruption.321 This point has been mentioned by the World Bank and applied perfectly
in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Sweden.322 According to the World Bank, there is a
strong connection between the spread of corruption and the low salaries of civil
servants.323 In a working paper of the International Monetary Fund, it was found that
to combat corruption not only the salaries of civil servants should be high but their
salaries should be high in terms of the salaries of their counterparts in the private
sector.324

F. Accountability in the Civil Service
Accountability means, "One official or organization is required to explain and justify
its actions to another body or authority, according to specified criteria, where the body
or authority, to which account is given, normally has power to take remedial action
when the criteria are not met."325
Objectives of accountability include improving the quality of administration,
protecting the rights of citizens dealing with the administration, and increasing the
legitimacy of the government.326 Accountability improves the quality of
administration by positively affecting the behavior of civil servants.327 Also,
reviewing the acts and decisions of the civil servants through courts and
ombudsperson bodies may change it for the better.328 In addition to that,
ombudsperson's investigations in a certain case may result in a recommendation for a
better practice.329 Accountability ensures that the discretionary power of the civil
servants is used fairly and according to laws and regulations.330 It increases the
legitimacy of the government by making sure that the government respects openness
and transparency, and by requiring the government to become accountable.331
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Accountability of the government or the administration can be ensured through many
institutions like courts and ombudsperson bodies.332 Ombudsperson is "an
independent statutory body whose task is to investigate complaints made by
individuals or groups about the actions of administrative bodies."333 Ombudsperson
bodies perform a role that otherwise would not be properly performed. It is created
according to a law that specifies its jurisdiction.334 Ombudsperson bodies must be
independent of the government or the administration since its main role is to
investigate them.335 Ombudsperson bodies investigate the complaints of the citizens
against civil servants to make sure they are performing well.336 The result of the
investigation could be a sanction for the civil servant or a recommendation for a better
practice or both.337
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IV.

Critique of the World Bank's and IMF's Reform Strategy of the Civil
Service

A. Internal Critique
The Bank, being a financial institution, is concerned with good governance from an
economic perspective only. The government's role in governance is to ensure the
efficiency of the market and to correct its failure. The efficiency of the public
institutions is measured by their ability to support the market.338
Governance was originally defined by the World Bank as "the exercise of political
power to manage a nation's affair."339 This definition is neutral in the sense that both
good and bad governance is considered as an exercise of political power to manage a
nation's affairs. Later, the World Bank started using the term "good governance."
"Good" here refers to the ability of the government to implement the Bank's reform
programs.340 The relationship between the Bank and the country applying its
conditions is a lender-borrower relationship. Hence, the conditions of the Bank are
limited to ensuring the ability of the country to repay its debt through applying the
programs of the Bank.341 The conditions' main purpose is to mitigate the risk of noncompliance of the borrower.342 They are used by the creditors to ensure the debtors'
ability to repay.343
In the Egyptian context, this is not new. The interests of the international financial
institutions, being creditors, in the 21st century are similar to the interests of the
creditors in the 19th century. According to Cromer, in 1879, England wanted Egypt to
be administered well to repay its debt.344 In the 2000s, the World Bank and the IMF
also wanted Egypt to be administered well to repay its debt. Although the concept of
good governance is relatively new, it is not different from the concept of good
administration embraced by England in 1879. Creditors in the 19th century and the
21st century both considered the government intervention in the market as the reason
behind the economic crisis and it is better to limit that intervention and assign a bigger
338
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role to the private sector. Both of them recommended a reform policy based on
limiting public expenditures, reforming tax systems, and reforming the civil service.
Some of these points need to be scrutinized
1. Controlling the Public Wage Bill
The Bank and the IMF have been focusing on the public wage bill being a large item
in the budget.345 Therefore, controlling this item by reducing it helps reduce the public
expenditures. To reduce the public wage bill, they advised controlling the salaries of
the civil servants.346 However, the extent to which the public wage bill represents the
salaries of the civil servants depends on what they mean by civil servants. Yet, there
is no consensus on what is meant by civil servants.
In Egypt, chapter one of the general budget of the state includes the wages and
compensations of employees.347 These employees include public teachers, public
health workers, judges, prosecutors, police and army personnel, university professors,
employees of public enterprises, and so on. Hence, controlling the public wage bill
means controlling the wages or salaries of all these categories, this is because the
World Bank and the IMF do not indicate what they mean by civil servants.
The World Bank in its Country Partnership Framework for Egypt for the period FY
2015-2019 counts teachers as civil servants.348 While another study published by the
Bank evaluating the good governance reforms, in general, differentiates between civil
servants and teachers, being public employees.349 In a study by the World Bank
concerning the public administration reform in 34 countries, it was noted that 14
countries considered health employees as civil servants, and 16 countries considered
teachers as civil servants, while 22 countries considered police as civil servants.350
Therefore, in a study by the Public Sector Management and Information Technology
Team of the World Bank in 1997, these differences were recognized as a
methodological problem in improving the civil service and it was suggested that
345
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education and health services should be separated because they need a different
policy.351 However, this suggestion was ignored as teachers are considered civil
servants in the dealings between the World Bank and Egypt. This is because when the
Bank provides loans it does not separate between civil servants and public servants, it
separates between the civilian government and the military. Civilian government
includes civil servants, public servants, and employees in public enterprises and they
all could be categorized into central government and local government.352 Although
public expenditures include civil and military expenses, donors focus on the civil
expenses, at least in the beginning. The UNDP explains that donors focus on the civil
expenditures because it is seen as the easiest item to be reduced in the budget, while
they postpone discussing military expenditures.353 It adds this creates high pressure on
the reduction of the civil expenditures, while affects the quality of the provided
services.354 This can be seen in the Bank's discussions concerning improving
governance through enhancing the public sector in Argentina where it started by the
reduction of the civil expenditures while postponing the reduction of the military
expenditures. The Bank states, "At the request of the [Argentinean] Ministry of
Defense, a recent World Bank internal report analyzed military expenditure in detail.
Although Bank reports in the past have touched on defense expenditures, this was the
first deep analytical work on the subject in a country context."355
Worth mentioning here that, the role of the military was not part of the discussions of
good governance. Yet, military expenditures, being public expenditures, subjected the
military to these discussions. Therefore, concerning the public sector reform in
Argentina, the Bank stated, "Argentina's achievements in stabilization and structural
reform in the past two years are widely recognized. One element in the reform of the
public sector has been a reduction in military spending, accompanied by a program to
rationalize the armed forces in tune with the country's security needs."356 So, the
World Bank, which is a financial institution, advises governments not only on how to
run their institutions but also advises them on their security needs and military
requirements.
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The conditions of the IMF and the World Bank that they set to help Egypt improve
governance have two main goals; fiscal consolidation through reducing expenditures
and increasing revenues, and improving public services especially health and
education.357 The plan is to reduce the wage bill and the subsidies to reduce
expenditures while increasing and reforming tax collection then using the tax
revenues to fund health and education sectors.
In a study published by the World Bank it has been noted that, concerning the
adequate salary for civil servants, there is no one-size-fits-all policy that works for all
countries.358 Wages adequacy is a relative concept that is different from one place to
another and related to the wages of the private sector in the concerned country.359
Hence, in developing countries where the salary of the civil servants is already low,
reducing it more leads to demotivation, inefficiency, brain drain, and corruption.360
One of the used methods by governments to reduce public wages while avoiding the
damaging consequences is introducing performance pay.361 However, performance
pay, like bonuses and incentives, was found to be only modestly effective in the
public sector because it is difficult to quantify the output of the work and it is difficult
to avoid patronage and favoritism, in addition to subjecting the civil service to
political control.362
The Deputy Division Chief in the IMF's Research Department points out that reducing
salaries and raising tax revenues are contradicting goals. This is because low public
wages have been connected to corruption especially in revenue-generating
administrative units.363 He adds, 20-30 percent of Nepal's revenues in the 1980s were
not collected because of corrupt customs officials, while 47 percent of the tax
revenues were not collected in Thailand because of corrupt tax officials.364
Furthermore, targeting revenue-generating administrative units with a salary increase
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to fix this problem did not prove to be effective because it attracts skills from the
other units, which affects it negatively.365
Reducing salaries is not a preferable measure for governments and they choose to
implement it only under the pressure of the conditions of the international donors. If it
were left to them, they would choose other options for fiscal consolidation. Therefore,
when Egypt received a loan from the IMF in 1991 without targeted public sector
conditions it succeeded in meeting its deficit target while raising the public sector
wage bill by 12%.366 It managed to do so by raising domestic energy prices,
increasing customs duties, and terminating some tax exemptions.367 This shows that
reducing the salaries of civil servants is not the only path for fiscal consolidation. It is
not even an effective path, according to the Independent Evaluation Office of the
IMF, which reported that public wage cuts induced by the conditions did not last
because of the local pressure.368 The UNDP reached the same conclusion and
described the public wage cuts as 'politically near impossible.'369
In a discussion paper prepared by the Bank and the IMF in 2002, they acknowledged
that their reform policies focused mainly on controlling the wage bill, which
negatively affected public employment and led to brain drain in the public sector.370
In 2003, the Bank realized that there is no clear evidence that savings in public
expenditures contribute to public administration reform,371 there is little relationship
between reform programs and savings, there is no evidence that the savings are the
result of the reform program, and although some reduction has been made in public
expenditures, the gross public debt has increased.372 Yet, the IMF and the Bank kept
focusing on controlling the wage bill in the conditions of the loans given to Egypt in
2015 and 2016.
In 2019, a Guidance Note published by the Bank acknowledged again the inadequacy
of controlling the wage bill because it is a politically sensitive matter, which faces
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pressure from the civil servants.373 It is politically sensitive because it is used by the
governments to please the public and depriving the governments of this tool harms
them.374 In Egypt for instance, a correlation was found between the dates of
increasing special bonuses and the presidential election.375 Thus, the bonuses were
used by the Egyptian president Mubarak to secure votes in the presidential election.376
The Guidance Note also mentioned that public wage cuts were compensated by
numerous discretionary allowances and that resulted in a less transparent pay system
instead of a smaller wage bill.377
The policy of reducing public wages while increasing spending on health and
education entails contradictions. Since the Bank and the IMF consider public teachers
and public health workers as civil servants, they are targeted by the wage cut policy.
At the same time, the Bank argues that teachers in Egypt are low paid and that
negatively affects the quality of the education.378 Indeed the Bank recently started
focusing on the social aspects of development but this does not distract the Bank away
from the neo-liberal economic policies, which require privatization and liberalization
programs that reduce social expenses and strengthen the power of the capital.379
Therefore, reviewing the expenditures of the developing indebted countries shows
that debt repayments do not leave much for social needs.380 For instance, In Ethiopia
debt repayments are four times more than spending on health care at a time when a
hundred thousand children die every year from easily preventable diseases.381 In
Tanzania, debt repayments are six times more than spending on health care while the
youth mortality rate is high.382 Even Uganda, where the Bank and the IMF applied
relief schemes to mitigate the social implications of their structural adjustment
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programs, spends on debt repayments more than on education and health sectors
combined.383
2. Civil Service Law Reform

Reforming the civil service through changing or amending the civil service law is the
oldest method used for civil service reform in Egypt. Starting from 1837 when qanun
al-siyasa al-malakiyya or the Siyasatname law was issued until 2016 when Law
81/2016 was issued.
Concerning the reform in Egypt in the 19th century, Cromer pointed out that laws
already existed but it was not applied.384 Yet, instead of searching for the reasons
behind not applying the law, reformers kept changing the civil service laws. The Bank
noticed this repetition concerning the civil service reform. It points out that the
previous initiatives for civil service reform looked like each other. They were based
on the same diagnosis and prescribed the same solutions for decades.385 In turn, the
Bank proposed its reform policy, which is a new civil service law. According to the
Bank, the new civil service law should allow for early retirement, voluntary
retirement, and retrenchment.386 It should also regulate the recruitment, dismissal,
promotion of civil servants, as well as performance-related salary increases, leave
options, and bonuses, in addition to introducing performance measurement criteria
and for meritocratic recruitment and promotion of staff.387 It should also increase
accountability.388 Thus, the new civil service law should help in downsizing the civil
service through early retirement, voluntary retirement, and retrenchment, in addition
to introducing a merit-based system for recruitment and promotion. Moreover, it
should limit new hiring, allow for long-time and short-time contracts for new hires
instead of permanent employment, and increase accountability through performance
monitoring systems.389
Towards this end, the Bank focused on the civil service law reform and praised the
issuance of Law 18/2016. However, the civil service law is not the only law that
regulates civil service in Egypt. In 2010, "there [were] more than 40 different laws
383
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and regulations and no less than 55 decrees regulating the government employees’
pay system."390 Yet, only the civil service law was targeted by the legislative reform.
This means that the reform of the civil service law included only those who are
subject to Law 18/2016 without addressing other public employees. However, it is
difficult to determine those who are subject to Law 18/2016 precisely. This is due to
the fact that the civil service law in Egypt is considered the general law that organizes
the relationship between civil servants and the government and next to that law exist
tens of laws, regulations, and decrees that organize certain public jobs. For instance,
Egyptian judges' employment is organized by the law of the judicial authority number
46/1972 that was amended by Law 77/2019, however, according to article 89 of that
law their vacations are subject to the civil service law. Egyptian teachers in public
schools are subject to the law of education number 139/1981 that was amended by
Law 16/2019, nonetheless, according to article 70 of that law the civil service law
regulates their employment in the absence of a clear stipulation in Law 139/1981.
Thus, it is difficult to determine the categories of employees who are subject to the
civil service law.
The new civil service law should work for downsizing the civil service. Downsizing is
a relative concept; hence, determining the adequate number of civil servants is
different from one country to another.391 Downsizing should not be applied out of
fiscal needs because it carries its own risks. The short-term risks include brain drain
when skilled staff are retrenched or were encouraged to leave.392 The medium-term
risks include the reoccurrence of overstaffing if human resources management is not
strengthened.393 The long-term risks include the low quality of the provided
services.394 For instance, downsizing led to less access to health services in Estonia
and Ireland.395
In a World Bank study Prepared by Wouter van Acker and Zahid Hasnain, they
mentioned that improving the civil service in the developing countries could mean
increasing the number of civil servants not downsizing.396 Moreover, downsizing
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failed in producing a permanent effect and early retirements led to a rise in pension
payments.397 This means that downsizing is often counterproductive.
It could also be noticed that, concerning salaries and size of civil servants, the Bank
and the IMF did not set a target for the Egyptian civil service. They did not point out
the adequate salaries to be paid or the adequate size of the civil service. They just put
a target for cuts in general during the time of the program, however, whenever Egypt
meets the target, usually, the final evaluation is more need to be done, and further
steps need to be taken.398
The new civil service law should also increase the efficiency of the civil servants and
combat the informal approaches of recruitment and promotion. According to the
Bank, the new civil service law shall require merit for recruitment and promotions.399
However, formally, recruitment and promotion in the Egyptian civil service have
always been merit-based.400 The problem of poor performance does not exist because
of the absence of a law that stipulates merit for recruitment and promotion but it exists
because the law is not applied.401 There have always been performance assessments
but they are used as rewards and because of the low wages, managers give all their
staff high scores to allow them to receive the bonus that is tied to the assessment.402
Hence, 97% of the Egyptian civil servants are rated "excellent."403 And since the
wages are going to be even lower because of controlling the public wage bill, we
should not expect the new civil service law to be applied differently. Wouter van
Acker noted that some systems could be formally merit-based but not in practice.404
Without solving the problem of the application, changing the law will not be
effective.
Furthermore, the new civil service law should allow for new hires through fixed-term
contracts. The World Bank noticed that the Egyptian civil service, being tenured or
career-based, provides high job security and a low possibility of dismissal.405
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Therefore, to reform the civil service, the Bank suggested using long-term and shortterm contracts for new hires instead of permanent employment.406 This solution is not
new in Egypt; it has been used before twice and failed. To change the permanent
status of the career-based civil service, the Egyptian government started hiring
employees using short-term contracts according to Law 47/1978. However, the
Parliament later changed the law to allow converting the short-term contract into a
tenured service after three years.407 Also, because it is hard to attract highly skilled
professionals using the low wages of the civil service, the Egyptian government
contracted with the needed skilled professionals as technical advisors to ministers
with competitive compensation packages.408 However, this system was canceled after
2011 because it created tensions and because of setting minimum and maximum
wages for civil servants.409 Given the failure of this mechanism in Egypt and
elsewhere, the Bank and the IMF concluded that there is strong evidence that the
large-scale use of fixed-term contracts is not productive.410 However, using fixed-term
contracts is still found in their conditions to Egypt.
The new civil service law should also allow for contracting out some public services
and to increase the accountability of the civil servants through citizens' engagement
but these objectives are contradicting. Contracting out is when the "government
transfers supply or operation of a function to a contractor for a specified period of
time, but without relinquishing program responsibility or accountability."411
Contracting out is used to save public expenditures by providing public services
through contractors instead of permanent civil servants. It is one of the suggested
solutions by the World Bank for improving governance in Egypt.412
Citizen engagement is also a fundamental element in improving governance,
according to the Bank.413 Citizen engagement means empowering the citizens to hold
public officials accountable and to give feedback on service delivery.414 These in turn
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improve transparency, accountability, and the quality of service delivery.415 The Bank
explains, "Introducing and strengthening mechanisms for citizens’ feedback on
service delivery would also enhance the accountability of both public entities and civil
servants and restore citizen confidence in the ability of the state to provide quality
services."416 In Egypt, there are twelve institutions responsible for transparency and
accountability. Only five of them provide citizens with a mechanism to give feedback
on public service quality. Only one institution of the five has the power to detect
corruption, receive complaints, investigate the detected incidents and complaints,
prosecute the violators.417 This institution is the Administrative Prosecution
Authority. The Administrative Prosecution Authority plays the role of the
ombudsperson bodies that exist in other countries under different names.
Contracting out public services deprives the Egyptian citizens of the ability to give
feedback on the quality of the public services provided to them through private
contractors, and impedes accountability concerning public service delivery. This is
because the Administrative Prosecution Authority has no jurisdiction over the private
contractors, who are not subject to any other mechanism of accountability except the
terms of the contract. Hence, the expansion in contracting out public services and
strengthening the citizen engagement for accountability in Egypt are contradicting
goals.
Dr. Cheselden George V. Carmona explains that the expansion of contracting out
public services deprived the citizens of their right in holding service providers
accountable, especially in poor countries where they cannot afford to file lawsuits
against the service providers who are not subject to the ombudsperson body.418 Hence,
accountability of the service providers should not be secured through the market only
but also through state accountability channels, especially the ombudsperson bodies.419
Therefore, some states expanded the jurisdiction of their ombudsperson bodies to

415

Id. at ii.
Id. at 9.
417
OECD, supra note 135 at 46.
418
Dr. Cheselden George V. Carmona, Ensuring Accountability in Privatized and Decentralized
Delivery of Public Services: The Role of the Asian Ombudsman, 3 (2012).
419
Id. at 7.
416

57

cover the private contractors that provide public services, like Japan, Malaysia,420 and
Argentina.421
In Egypt, for instance, contracting out public services, like managing the system of
the smart cards of the Ministry of Supply to private companies that earn around 44
million Egyptian Pounds a month,422 led to the inability of the Administrative
Prosecution Authority to handle the citizens' complaints against those providers. The
jurisdiction of the Administrative Prosecution Authority that kept growing along the
history reflecting the growing role of the government and the civil service in the
economy is now diminishing under the concept of good governance that calls for
minimal governmental intervention in the market. Hence, in September 2020, was
issued Law 185/2020 amending Law 203/1991 concerning the companies of the
public business sector. The new law subjected the disciplinary procedures of all
public servants in the holding and subsidiary public companies to Labor Law. They
are no longer subject to the Administrative Prosecution Authority unless requested by
the minister or the board of directors. In other words, the new law deprived the
Administrative Prosecution Authority of investigating citizens' complaints against
public servants in those companies and banned the Administrative Prosecution
Authority from voluntarily investigating the violations of those public servants. This
new situation means that public servants who work in those companies will be subject
to the arbitrary powers of their superiors with no recourse to an independent
institution that handles their grievances and it also leads to less accountability since
the disciplinary procedures shall be handled internally.
3. The World Bank and the IMF Self-critique
Given the implications of reforming the civil service through reducing salaries,
downsizing, amending the civil service law, limiting new hires, hiring employees by
fixed-term contracts, and contracting out public services, in 2002, the World Bank
and the IMF reevaluated the efficiency of their reform policies. They realized that:
Their civil service reform programs have not been very successful in achieving the
fiscal and structural targets. This is because the fiscal and structural targets are
420
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contradicting. Controlling the wage bill to reduce the fiscal deficit through reducing
salaries and downsizing led to the loss of skilled civil servants who are needed for the
success of the structural reforms. They acknowledge that controlling the wage bill is
not sustainable in the medium term.423
Transforming the career-based or tenured civil service into contractual employment
through short-term and long-term contracts, and introducing a performance-based pay
system both proved to be not productive.424
Their programs did not consider the political constraints. The stability of the
government applying the reform is very important for the success of the reform.
However, when the government uses public employment as a social safety net,
downsizing may lead to its destabilization and its inability to implement the reform
program.425
They do not usually have enough clear data concerning the wages breakdown and
concerning comparisons of public sector wages with those of the private sector. This
in turn leads to misguided policies.426
In 2003, based on a request from the Russian Federation to check which reform
policies are better suited for it, the Bank made another reevaluation of its
administrative reform policies and found that:
Although the importance of the institutions for the market and development has been
recognized, "it is not at all clear which institutions are the most crucial and there is
very little evidence that the specific details of government structure and accountability
arrangements affect growth. There is also only modest evidence that administrative
reform is an 'independent variable'. A reasonable argument can be made that it is the
consequence rather than the cause of other aspects of liberalization."427
The reform policies had four targets; reducing public expenditures, improving the
implementation of policies, improving the civil service, and improving the quality of
the public services. However, according to the Bank, these targets were not sought as
423
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ends but only as means to make savings. Yet, it is not clear how these targets
contributed to the public administration reform.428
Reforming the management of the civil servants include, inter alia, improving job
security, enhancing protection from political interference, standardized
implementation of the promotion and reward rules, and encouraging career-based
civil service.429
There is no clear evidence that the reform programs have achieved the targets they
sought. Even there is no clear evidence that the reform programs managed to address
the fiscal deficit because the gross public debt as a percentage of the GDP has
increased.430
There is a weak link between the reform programs and any savings made. This is due
to the inability to confirm that the identified savings are the result of the reform
program. Hence, it cannot be decided whether the reform led to the savings or the
savings from almost arbitrary cuts led to the reform.431
The evaluation concluded that there is no one-size-fits-all reform policy that applies
everywhere. What succeeds in a certain country does not necessarily succeed in
another country. The historical, political, and economic contexts must be taken into
consideration.432
In 2019, a study published by the Bank revising its experience in wage bill and pay
reform explains that the Bank's main interest concerning the public wage bill reform
is improving a country's fiscal sustainability.433 Nevertheless, this policy has its
consequences. Civil servants are vital for providing high-quality public services. In
developing countries, improving the quality of public services may mean increasing
the number of civil servants. Hence, it is important to find a balance between the cost
and the efficiency, and it is important to take the political economy of pay reform into
consideration but reviewing the previous evaluations reveals that the reform policies
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take a one-size-fits-all approach.434 This is due to the fact that the World Bank teams
rarely carry out political-economic analyses before advising governments.435 This
explains why the wage freeze and the downsizing policies failed to produce a
permanent effect and in some countries, they were counterproductive.436 Although
this study was published sixteen years after the previous one, it highlights the same
pitfall of the Bank's policies.

B. External Critique
The first chapter of this thesis shows how the consecutive civil service reform
initiatives in Egypt had different goals. For instance, Mohamed Ali's civil service and
administrative reform initiative was to, among other things, build a strong army. His
successors, Khedive Sa'id and Khedive Isma'il applied their reforms to aid the new
public projects and so did Nasser's regime. The subsequent regimes applied civil
service reform initiatives to aid the application of the open-door policy. During the
debt crisis, the foreign creditors of Egypt applied a civil service and administrative
reform to be able to collect their debt back. The World Bank and the IMF also allege
that the civil service reform is needed to mitigate the chronic fiscal deficit.
Although those reform initiatives had different goals, they can be categorized into two
categories; proceduralist or structural reforms and fiscal reforms. Structural reforms
are concerned with the efficiency of the civil service. Efficiency means the ability of
the civil service to perform the role that it was entrusted to perform. An example of
the structural reforms can be Mohamed Ali and his successors increasing the number
of the civil servants and the administrative units to enhance the performance of the
civil service.
On the Other hand, fiscal reforms are concerned with the financial burdensome of
running the civil service. The fiscal aspect of running the civil service is mainly
related to the wage bill that includes the salaries of the civil servants, their pensions,
rewards, bonuses, allowances, etc. An example of the fiscal reforms can be the World
Bank and the IMF suggesting freezing the public wage bill to face the fiscal deficit.

434

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
436
Id. at 2.
435

61

It is not easy to make a distinction between the structural aspects and the fiscal
aspects of the civil service reform.437 This is because a single aspect could be
structural and fiscal at the same time. For instance, the number of the civil servants
could be a structural aspect of the reform when deciding the appropriate number of
civil servants needed for the civil service to function well, while the same aspect
could be fiscal when deciding the ability to afford to have that number of civil
servants.
In the internal critique, I tackled how the World Bank and the IMF give priority to the
fiscal aspects of reform over the structural aspects, which in turn badly affects the
effectiveness of the civil service. In the external critique, I tackle the impact of the
effectiveness of the civil service, being an element of good governance, on the quality
of the public services and human rights.
Enhancing the effectiveness of the civil service does not necessarily enhance the
quality of the public services provided for the citizens. This is because the role of the
civil service has not always been providing the public with services. For instance,
when Mohamed Ali applied the civil service reform it was mainly to enhance the role
of the civil service in supporting conscription not to provide citizens with public
services and to protect their human rights.
However, with the evolution of the role of the state, it started to bear the main
responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights,438 hence the effectiveness
of the civil service became related to that responsibility. Therefore, we can relate
many roles of the civil servants within the different ministries in Egypt and elsewhere
to human rights responsibilities. For instance, the Egyptian Ministry of Supply and
Internal Trade is responsible for food security, which relates to the human right of
everyone to adequate food according to Article 11 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The Egyptian Ministry of Education
should ensure the right to education according to Article 13 of the ICESCR. The
Egyptian Ministry of Health should ensure the right to health according to Article 12
of the ICESCR.
437
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The World Bank explains how its civil service reform programs kept pace with that
evolution of the role of the state by stating that "civil service reform programs
supported by the World Bank have responded to three sets of concerns. Some
reforms, particularly those pursued in the 1980s, were primarily concerned to address
the fiscal concerns arising from overstaffing and unsustainable wage bills. Other,
more recent reforms, were intended to facilitate policy agility in government and to
ensure that legitimate policies could in fact be implemented. Most recently, reforms
have tended to focus on improving operational efficiency and service quality."439
Yet, the civil service reform programs supported by the World Bank and the IMF,
which give priority to the fiscal aspects, do not always enhance the service quality but
sometimes they worsen the situation and negatively affect the human rights of the
beneficiaries. Policies like privatization, contracting out public services, and
controlling the public wage bill had a negative impact on human rights in many
countries.440 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
raised these concerns regarding Egypt by stating that "The Committee regrets that the
State party does not take its obligations under the Covenant into account in its
negotiations with international financial institutions."441 CESCR raised similar
concerns regarding Zambia by stating that "The Committee is concerned about the
fact that privatized social security schemes in the State party have not been financially
sustainable, thereby leaving its beneficiaries without adequate social protection."442
The reason behind these concerns is that the perspective of the World Bank and the
IMF concerning the civil service reform is a fiscal perspective. Instead of trying to
make a balance between the structural and the fiscal aspects of the civil service reform
to provide the citizens with high-quality public services within the financial ability of
the state to respect their human rights, the Bank and the IMF outweigh the side of the
fiscal aspects. Therefore, although the Bank argues that teachers in Egypt are low paid
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and that negatively affects the quality of the education,443 it still targets them by the
controlling of public wages policy.
By outweighing the side of the fiscal aspects of the civil service reform, the initiatives
of the World Bank and the IMF are not different from the previous initiatives for
reforming the Egyptian civil service. All of them focus either on the structural and/or
fiscal aspects with different degrees. None of those initiatives reflects the role of the
state and its civil service as the guarantor of the welfare and human rights of all
citizens.
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V.
Conclusion
Governments use the civil service for different goals. Throughout the history of
Egypt, the different rulers and foreign creditors used the civil service for different
purposes. Mohamed Ali used it to support conscription444 while Isma'il used it to run
the expanding public projects.445 The British and French creditors used the civil
service to apply their administrative reform for the sake of debt repayment.446 Nasser
used the civil service to support the expanding public industrial activities and
nationalizing industries along with providing employment for graduates.447 On the
other hand, Sadat adopted the open-door economic policy, which meant that he did
not need a big civil service but he used the civil service for social and political
purposes.448 The different purposes of using the civil service entailed different reform
strategies. Hence, the size of the civil service, for instance, was subject to the role it
played.
Starting from the 2000s, the World Bank and the IMF suggested an administrative
reform strategy for Egypt based on the concept of good governance to help Egypt
achieve its economic goals.449 Their administrative reform strategy explained the goal
of using the public sector while their civil service reform strategy explained how to
make the civil service able to achieve that goal.
The World Bank claims that the role of the government should be limited to
improving the infrastructure and providing some social services like health and
education.450 Yet, it did not adjust the civil service according to that role. Rather, the
goal of the civil service reform was to make savings.451 The administrative reform
policies had four targets; reducing public expenditures, improving the implementation
of policies, improving the civil service, and improving the quality of the public
services. However, according to the Bank, these targets were not sought as ends but
only as means to make savings.452
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This explains the contradiction between the alleged goals of the administrative reform
and the civil service reform strategy. The civil service reform strategy was not set to
achieve the administrative reform but to make savings. This can be seen in the reports
concerning the situation in the countries where the World Bank and the IMF applied
their reforms, which explain that spending on debt repayment outweighed other
expenditures of the governments.453
Being creditors, the World Bank's and the IMF's relationship with the borrowing
country is a lender-borrower relationship. Hence, they give priority to debt repayment
over promoting economic growth. This explains why they keep pushing developing
countries to cut expenditures by controlling the public wage bill and downsizing the
civil service regardless of their acknowledgment that their civil service reform
strategy is not effective.
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APPENDIX A
IMPORTANT LAWS IN THE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN CIVIL SERVICE
The law
Qanun al-filaha (the law of farming) –
1830

Al-siyasa al-malakiyya or the
Siyasatname law – 1837
The high order of 10 April 1883
The high order of 24 May 1885
The high order of 19 February 1887

The high order of 24 December 1888

The decree dated 1 June 1893
The decree dated 23 March 1901
The decree dated 24 June 1901

Law number 15 was issued on 15 May
1913
Law number 210/1951

Law number 47/1978

Law number 81/2016

Reason of issuance
Was issued by Mohammed Ali to
regulate the responsibilities of the civil
servants and to face the non-compliance
of the shaykhs of the villages concerning
conscription.
Was issued by Mohammed Ali to
regulate the disciplinary procedures of
the civil servants.
Organized appointing, promoting, and
dismissing the civil servants.
Organized the disciplinary procedures of
the civil servants.
Concerning submitting the disciplinary
procedures of high-ranking officials to an
administrative court.
Concerning the formation of a high
disciplinary court specialized in
administrative cases against non-highranking civil servants.
Regulating the ranks of the jobs in
governorates.
Concerning disciplinary sanctions for
civil servants.
Ratifying the regulations of the Egyptian
and foreign civil servants in the Egyptian
government along with temporary
workers.
Concerning the financial rights of civil
servants who were dismissed by
disciplinary procedures.
It covered almost all the aspects
concerning the civil servants like
appointment, promotion, and disciplinary
proceedings. It was enacted to stop the
system of pricing educational certificates.
It was issued because of the failure of the
previous law in stopping the pricing
system and its failure in regulating the
civil service based on objective rules.
It was issued to apply the administrative
reform plan that was suggested by the
World Bank and the IMF.
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